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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the government of Uganda has been engaged in peace
talks with the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to end the nation’s
devastating civil war. By most accounts, the talks have represented the
best chance yet to realize a conclusive end to the twenty-year conflict,
but negotiations have frequently stalled because of the still unresolved
question of accountability for serious crimes.1 In 2005, the International
Criminal Court (ICC or Court) issued arrest warrants for a handful of
LRA leaders accused of crimes against humanity and other grave offenses.2 Although it was Uganda that initially referred the matter to the
ICC,3 the government later took the position that it would seek withdrawal of the ICC warrants if the accused agreed to undergo a traditional tribal justice ritual that requires a public confession and an apology
without threat of incarceration.4 More recent developments in Uganda
indicate a plan to supplement traditional justice with more formal court
proceedings for those accused of the most serious crimes. However, it
1. See infra Part II.
2. See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005 (Sept. 27, 2005), available at
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.PDF [hereinafter Kony Warrant]; Prosecutor v.
Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Vincent Otti (July 8, 2005), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97189.PDF [hereinafter Otti Warrant]; Prosecutor v. Kony,
Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Okot Odhiambo (July 8, 2005), available at
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97197.PDF [hereinafter Odhiambo Warrant]; Prosecutor
v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen (July 8, 2005),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97201.PDF [hereinafter Ongwen Warrant];
Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Raska Lukwiya (July 8,
2005), available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97193.PDF [hereinafter Lukwiya
Warrant].
3. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, ICC-20040129-44 (Jan. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/Go?id=04d961fa-a963-4b7e-9ce0-e8a0ebf95822&lan=en-GB.
4. See Adrian Croft, Uganda Offers “Blood Settlement” to LRA Rebels, REUTERS, Mar. 12,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/featuredCrisis/idUSL11891647.
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remains unclear whether this formality shall be accompanied by more
meaningful punishment. How the ICC will respond to a request for deference to local justice also remains unresolved, and the LRA has previously maintained that it will not surrender until the ICC withdraws the
warrants. Indeed, the LRA has repeatedly blamed the ICC’s failure to
do so for the breakdown of negotiations.5
In an earlier article dealing with prosecutorial discretion and the ICC,
I argued that the particular structure and context of the Court imposes
fundamental policy dilemmas on the ICC prosecutor that go to the core
of the ICC’s goals.6 These dilemmas cannot be resolved by reference to
existing legal standards or those standards created by the ICC’s constitutive treaty, colloquially known as the Rome Statute.7 The Ugandan
peace process presents the ICC with its first crisis of this kind. On one
level, this episode reflects a classic dilemma of transitional justice, raising the oft-debated question of whether, and to what extent, criminal
justice may be compromised for the sake of peace. When viewed
through the particular framework of the ICC, however, the episode raises a distinct set of difficult institutional problems. Unlike predecessor
international criminal tribunals created on an ad hoc basis to address
specific historical events,8 the ICC is a standing tribunal with broad
temporal and geographic jurisdiction,9 staffed by prosecutors and judges
authorized to pursue many cases without the formal consent of any out5. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Uganda Peace Hinges on Amnesty for Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2006, at A1.
6. Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics: Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583 (2007).
7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
8. Tribunals created on an ad hoc basis include the International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo established by the Allied powers to prosecute international crimes committed
by the defeated Axis powers during World War II, as well as those created by the UN Security
Council to prosecute international crimes committed during the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 1, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (granting jurisdiction over
international crimes “committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for
such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994”); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art.
1, S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (extending jurisdiction to “serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991”); Charter of the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East, art. 1, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 (establishing a tribunal “for the just and
prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals in the Far East”); Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (establishing a tribunal “for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European
Axis”).
9. The Court’s jurisdiction extends to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide
committed after the Statute’s entry into force in 2002. Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 5, 11.

110

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 50:1

side actor.10 The Court’s unusual measure of institutional independence
ostensibly was intended to depoliticize the business of international
criminal justice by leaving the law to the lawyers. By contrast, past tribunals relied on political bodies, such as the UN Security Council, for
their jurisdiction in individual cases.11
As the Uganda crisis reveals, however, this transfer of formal authority has failed to produce meaningful criteria dictating how exactly
the ICC should exercise its authority. To put it more specifically, we are
often told that the ICC—with its prominent framework of “complementary” jurisdiction—is a last resort, designed to intervene only when national legal systems fail.12 As indicated by the Ugandan experience,
however, the Rome Statute leaves unanswered fundamental questions
about how far states recovering from mass violence should be required
to go in pursuit of criminal justice.13
These observations require a recharacterization of the ICC as it is
commonly perceived. While the Court is a criminal tribunal charged
with the prosecution of individual suspects, it is also empowered, as a
necessary incident of its prosecutorial power, with broad administrative
policy discretion to evaluate the adequacy of transitional justice policies
undertaken by states in which crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction have
10. For crimes committed on a state party’s territory or by a state party national, the prosecutor may initiate investigations and seek arrest warrants based either on the referral of a state party
or on his own authority. Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 12–15. Otherwise, the Court requires a
referral from the UN Security Council to proceed. Id. art. 13(b).
11. Although the United States lobbied to have all ICC cases be contingent upon an initial UN
Security Council referral, a group of so-called “like-minded” states prevailed in securing the
ICC’s existing referral system that grants greater authority to the Court itself. WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 15–20 (1st ed. 2001).
The “like-minded” states defended this position by emphasizing that the ICC must be driven by
legal considerations rather than political influence. See Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of
an Int’l Criminal Court, Report, ¶ 121, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (Sept. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Ad Hoc
Comm. on ICC Report] (reporting worries that mandatory Security Council referral “would reduce the credibility and moral authority of the court; excessively limit its role; . . . [and] introduce
an inappropriate political influence over the functioning of the institution”). This position also
drew strong support from representatives of nongovernmental organizations who played a critical
role in defining and supporting the agenda of the “like-minded” states. See William R. Pace &
Mark Thieroff, Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 391,
392–93 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (noting that “[m]any governments, the Secretary-General, other
United Nations officials and media experts have commented on the decisive role of NGOs at the
Rome Conference”).
12. See, e.g., Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Address at Nuremberg:
Building a Future on Peace and Justice (June 24–25, 2007), available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E466EDB-2B38-4BAF-AF5F-005461711149/143825/LMO_nuremberg
_20070625_English.pdf [hereinafter Moreno-Ocampo Address at Nuremberg] (explaining that “a
system of complementarity was designed whereby the Court intervenes as a last resort, when
States are unable or unwilling to act”).
13. See Rome Statute, supra note 7.
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occurred. This administrative quality of the Court’s work poses difficult
institutional dilemmas that receive no explicit attention in the text of the
Rome Statute and seem to play no role in the traditional rationales invoked to justify the Court’s creation. Indeed, the problem goes to the
very heart of the Court’s legitimacy as a supranational institution authorized to override the efforts of states, to whose populations the Court is
not democratically accountable. To the extent that many critical decisions are therefore not guided by meaningful legal criteria, has the
Rome Statute delegated decisional authority to the wrong actors? Which
policies, if any, should the ICC’s prosecutors and judges adopt to address these challenges?
In this Article, I take up these questions through a focused analysis of
the Uganda prosecutions, considering both the interpretive dilemmas
facing the Court and the efforts of Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to
address them. Part I provides a summary of events leading to the LRA
arrest warrants and the recent peace negotiations. Part II turns to the text
of the Rome Statute, with a focus on Article 19’s framework for complementary jurisdiction14 and the Article 53 dictate that “interests of justice” may trump the admissibility of investigations and cases that otherwise meet all relevant statutory criteria.15 Although the ICC is
structured to give deference to domestic proceedings, application of
these provisions to the Ugandan peace process reveals deep uncertainties regarding the ICC’s core relationship to domestic governance. Part
III explores how these uncertainties upset standard rationales for the
Court’s creation and looks to Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo’s response to
the Ugandan peace process, focusing both on the failure of existing prosecutorial guidelines to address the situation adequately and on the possibility of relying on various other actors to resolve the Ugandan dilemma. In the Conclusion, I consider different conceptions of the Court
that emerge from my discussion. I conclude that the Ugandan peace
process reveals the Court to be a promising but unstable institution, one
whose legitimacy may ironically depend on help from external stakeholders, including the very political actor—the UN Security Council—
whose importance the Rome Statute was designed, in part, to diminish.

I.

BACKGROUND: THE ICC ARREST WARRANTS

For the last twenty years, the LRA has been engaged in an armed
conflict against the government of Uganda.16 Led by Joseph Kony, a
14. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 19.
15. Id. art. 53.
16. For a general account of the LRA’s rise, see TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE
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self-professed “spirit medium” who claims he will rule Uganda according to the Ten Commandments, the LRA has been responsible for widespread atrocities. The group has primarily targeted Uganda’s ethnic
Acholi who populate the Acholiland region of northern Uganda where
the insurgency initially took root and whose interests the LRA claims to
protect. Under Kony’s leadership, the LRA has been responsible for the
forced abduction, conscription, and abuse of tens of thousands of children, who at times have comprised as much as eighty-five percent of the
group’s forces.17 Reports paint a grim picture of these abductees’ treatment. According to one ICC document, the children are
used as soldiers, porters, labourers and sexual slaves in the case
of girls. As part of initiation into the rebel movement, abducted
children are forced into committing inhuman acts, including ritual killing and mutilations. The total number of abducted children is reported to be over 20,000. Children are reported frequently beaten and forced to carry heavy loads over long distances,
loot and burn houses, beat and kill civilians and fellow abductees, and abduct other children.18
LRA gunmen have also been responsible for indiscriminate murder,
mutilation, torture, and rape of civilians, as well as widespread destruction of property. These atrocities, moreover, have produced a corresponding humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda, where somewhere
around one million residents—as much as seventy-five percent of the
population in these districts—have been displaced. To avoid abduction,
thousands of other children have become “night dwellers,” leaving their
villages only at night and “walking large numbers of kilometres to regroup in centres run by non-governmental organisations, on the streets,
on shop verandas, on church grounds, and in local factories heading
back to their villages at dawn.”19
Over the last several years, the Ugandan government has pursued
multiple strategies to end the war. In addition to military efforts, the
government passed legislation in early 2000 offering blanket amnesty to
any LRA member who agreed to surrender and renounce involvement
with the rebellion.20 A seven-member Amnesty Commission is responINTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY (2006).
17. Int’l Criminal Court, Background Information on the Situation in Uganda (Jan. 29, 2004),
available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/19769 [hereinafter Background Information] (note that the ICC removed the original background information document from its website before this Article went to print); cf. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 63 (questioning the eighty-five
percent statistic, but noting that “[t]he scale of child abduction has been terrible”).
18. Background Information, supra note 17.
19. Id.
20. Amnesty Act, 2000 ch. 294 § 3 (2000) (Uganda), available at http://www.ulii.org/
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sible for the administration of the statute.21 As of August 2008, at least
12,481 former LRA rebels had reportedly received amnesty under the
Act.22 Those receiving amnesty have included both low-level perpetrators and high-level LRA commanders.23
In June 2002, the Ugandan government ratified the Rome Statute.24
This action allowed the ICC prosecutor, acting either on his own initiative or at the referral of a treaty party, to commence investigations and
prosecutions of specified international crimes committed by Ugandan
citizens or on Ugandan soil after the treaty’s July 1, 2002 effective
date.25 With atrocities continuing, Uganda formally referred the LRA’s
crimes to the ICC in January 2004.26 The ICC prosecutor duly initiated
an investigation and, in July 2005, procured arrest warrants for Joseph
Kony and four other LRA leaders,27 two of whom, according to reports,
have since died.28
The Ugandan investigation was a landmark event in several respects.
It represented the first time a state party had referred a situation to the
ICC, and the resulting warrants were the first that the ICC issued.29 Deug/legis/consol_act/aa2000294120/.
21. Id. §§ 6–8.
22. Zahra Abigaba & Grace Matsiko, Government Pardons 23,000 Rebels, DAILY MONITOR
(Kampala), Aug. 12, 2008, available at http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/
Government_pardons_23_000_rebels_69.719.shtml. The article also indicates that the total number of amnesties under the Act is close to 23,000 when all Ugandan rebel groups are counted. Id.
23. OFFICE OF THE UN HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MAKING PEACE OUR OWN:
VICTIMS’ PERCEPTIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY, RECONCILIATION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN
NORTHERN UGANDA 27 (2007) [hereinafter MAKING PEACE OUR OWN].
24. See ICC – Uganda, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/African+States/
Uganda.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2009).
25. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 11. Pursuant to Article 126, the Rome Statute entered into
force sixty days after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Id. art. 126; see also Leila
Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court Treaty Enters Into Force, ASIL INSIGHTS (April
2002), available at http://www.asil.org/insigh86.cfm. As of June 1, 2009, the ICC had 110 members. ICC – The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/
states+parties/The+States+Parties+to+the+Rome+Statute.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) [hereinafter States Parties to the Rome Statute].
26. Press Release, supra note 3.
27. See Kony Warrant, supra note 2; Otti Warrant, supra note 2; Odhiambo Warrant, supra
note 2; Ongwen Warrant, supra note 2; Lukwiya Warrant, supra note 2.
28. The Court has formally withdrawn Raska Lukiwya’s warrant on account of his death.
Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Prosecution’s Request that the Warrant of Arrest
for Raska Lukwiya Be Withdrawn and Rendered Without Effect Because of His Death (Mar. 22,
2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc297257.pdf. The LRA has reportedly
executed Vincent Otti upon Kony’s order, but the warrant against him remains. See Uganda's
LRA Confirm Otti Death, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/7204278.stm.
29. See generally Mahnoush Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, Developments at the International Criminal Court: The Law-In-Action of the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
385 (2005); William Schabas, First Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court, 27 HUM.
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spite Moreno-Ocampo’s receptiveness to the referral, the warrants
raised questions about the scope of Article 17 of the Rome Statute,
which renders inadmissible cases “being investigated or prosecuted by a
State which has jurisdiction over it unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”30 As Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and W. Michael Reisman have observed, the drafters
of the Rome Statute generally conceived of the Court as a check on recalcitrant states rather than as a mechanism by which states would voluntarily cede jurisdiction over domestic legal matters.31
Although the LRA suspects all remain at large, the ICC referral and
arrest warrants are credited—along with a reversal of military fortune—
in bringing the LRA to the negotiating table.32 In the summer of 2006, a
peace agreement seemed within reach as the government of Southern
Sudan began brokering talks in Juba, Sudan between the LRA and the
Ugandan government. The Juba talks produced a unilateral ceasefire by
the LRA, followed by a truce agreement between the parties. After a
temporary breakdown caused by the LRA’s withdrawal, negotiations
resumed in 2007, with regional observers from Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, DR Congo, and South Africa participating.33
While I am hesitant to reduce the negotiating difficulties to a single
factor, news reports have consistently portrayed the ICC’s involvement
as a major stumbling block.34 Not surprisingly, the LRA leadership has
insisted on immunity from ICC prosecution.35 The Ugandan government, for its part, has shown a willingness to compromise and consider
RTS. L.J. 25 (2006).
30. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 17(1)(a).
31. Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 29, at 387. A state that proactively refers a case to the
ICC would hardly seem “unwilling” to prosecute, and the Rome Statute’s provision for “inability” seems to contemplate more than Uganda’s lack of success thus far in apprehending the suspects. Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute provides that “[i]n order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.” Rome Statute,
supra note 7, art. 17(3); see also JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME
STATUTE AND NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS 213 (2008) (“If one considers this practice
of auto-referrals, one cannot fail to notice its tension with the formal framework of complementarity in general and the procedural setting of complementarity in particular.”).
32. See, e.g., INT’L CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORT NO. 124, NORTHERN UGANDA: SEIZING
THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE ii (2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/
documents/africa/central_africa/124_northern_uganda_seizing_the_opportunity_for_peace.pdf.
33. See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA BRIEFING NO. 46, NORTHERN UGANDA PEACE
PROCESS: THE NEED TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM 2 (2007), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/central_africa/b46_north._uganda_peace_
process___need_to_maintain_momentum.pdf.
34. See, e.g., Gettleman, supra note 5, at A1.
35. Id.
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various alternatives to ICC prosecutions, or indeed to conventional
criminal justice. Much discussion has focused on Ugandan proposals to
confront LRA abuses through the deployment of traditional informal
dispute resolution methods historically relied upon by Uganda’s various
peoples to mete out justice at the local village level.36 Indeed, traditional
justice measures already have provided a method of integrating returning LRA members into their communities. These efforts have received
the encouragement of Uganda’s Amnesty Commission, acting under its
statutory duty “to consider and promote appropriate reconciliation mechanisms in the affected areas.”37 Although traditional justice appears to
enjoy some formal role within the Ugandan legal system as a general
method of resolving cases referred by local courts,38 the transplantation
of justice to the village setting is marked both by the informality of the
procedure employed and by a focus on monetary compensation and reconciliation rather than more severe criminal sanctions. According to
one study of traditional justice in Acholi culture, the “most important”
aspects of traditional justice are “the establishment of truth, the voluntary nature of the process (particularly on the behalf of the offender), the
payment of compensation to restore what was lost, and finally the restoration of social relations and unity of the family and clans.”39 Given the
36. See id.; Emmy Allio, Felix Osike & John Odyek, Kony Must Confess, THE NEW VISION
(Kampala), Feb. 21, 2007, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/550389; Croft, supra
note 4 (quoting Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni as saying that “what we have said in the
agreement is that instead of using this formal Western type of justice we are going to use the traditional justice, a traditional blood settlement mechanism”); Indictments Not on Talks Agenda,
Says Rugunda, NEW VISION (Kampala), Apr. 20, 2007, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/
D/8/13/560996/Rugunda (quoting Uganda internal affairs minister Ruhakana Rugunda as stating
that “[o]ur position on the court indictments is that, the government will engage the ICC after a
final peace agreement (is reached) and after the LRA have undergone the traditional justice system of mato-oput”); see also SCOTT WORDEN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, THE JUSTICE DILEMMA IN
UGANDA (2008), available at http://library.usip.org/articles/1011526.977/1.PDF.
37. Amnesty Act, 2000 ch. 294 § 8 (2000) (Uganda), available at http://www.ulii.org/ug/
legis/consol_act/aa2000294120/; see also Barney Afako, Reconciliation and Justice: Mato Oput
and the Amnesty Act, ACCORD, 2002, at 64, 67, available at http://www.c-r.org/ourwork/accord/northern-uganda/reconciliation-justice.php (noting that the Amnesty Commission
has been supportive of initiatives to employ traditional Acholi rituals as a means of promoting
reconciliation).
38. According to one study, traditional local courts often will refer ordinary cases—both civil
and criminal—within their jurisdiction to traditional leaders and elders, including matters involving “petty theft, instances of kiir (breaking cultural norms), incest, domestic violence, land disputes, and, in some cases—murder—if it is believed that it can be resolved locally.” ERIN
BAINES, JUSTICE & RECONCILIATION PROJECT, THE COOLING OF HEARTS: COMMUNITY TRUTHTELLING IN ACHOLI-LAND 11 (2007), available at http://www.justiceandreconciliation.com/#/
publications/4516360892.
39. LIU INST. FOR GLOBAL ISSUES ET AL., ROCO WAT I ACOLI: RESTORING RELATIONSHIPS
IN ACHOLI-LAND: TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO JUSTICE AND REINTEGRATION 14 (2005),
available at http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/JRP/15Sept2005_Roco_Wat_I_
Acoli.pdf.
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concentration of both victims and perpetrators among the Acholi population, much attention has focused on a particular ritual known as mato
oput40 (literally, “drinking of the bitter root”), which the Acholi have
traditionally used to address both intentional and accidental killings,41
and which exemplifies the aforementioned values. Although the particular elements of the mato oput may differ from case to case, the defining
feature of this tradition is that it restores social harmony after a homicide through confessions, negotiated compensation, and, ultimately, reconciliation between the offender and the victim’s kin.42 The process
culminates in a ritual whose individualized elements—typically including the beating of a stick, ritual slaughter, and the eating and drinking of
various substances (including the “bitter root” for which the ceremony
is named)—all play a symbolic role in furthering the goals of truthseeking and reconciliation. Alongside the Amnesty Act, these and other
cleansing rituals have played an important role to date in the reintegration of former LRA members into their communities.43
Consistent with these practices of traditional justice, Ugandan authorities have repeatedly suggested that a comprehensive peace agreement
would permit the specific LRA leaders sought by the ICC to undergo
alternative justice procedures of some form or another without need for
incarceration.44 In early 2007, for example, the government’s lead negotiator maintained that the LRA leaders would be required to confess to
their crimes, apologize, and become subject to certain sanctions, such as
payment of reparations and restrictions on their freedom of movement.45
Many accounts indicate that this solution enjoyed broad support among
Ugandans, and especially the Acholi. Indeed, the Ugandan government
largely justified its position by claiming that this is the course that the
Acholi desire.46 While visiting northern Uganda in September 2006, UN
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland reported
that “the predominant feeling among all the stakeholders in the peace
process is that the ICC warrant of arrest should be dropped against the
LRA leaders so that a peaceful conclusion to the talks can be
reached.”47 He elaborated that “[t]here is no doubt that 98 percent of the
IDPs [internally displaced persons] believe that peace is the priority and
40. BAINES, supra note 38, at 9.
41. LIU INST. FOR GLOBAL ISSUES ET AL., supra note 39, at 54, 57.
42. Id. at 54–66.
43. See id.; see also Afako, supra note 37, at 67.
44. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
45. Allio et al., supra note 36.
46. Id.
47. Grace Matsiko, Frank Nyakairu & Paul Harera, Kony Charges a Stumbling Block, Says
UN Chief, DAILY MONITOR (Kampala), Sept. 13, 2006.
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punishment for crimes committed is not.”48 Even Human Rights Watch,
a leading advocate for conventional criminal trials of those most responsible for LRA atrocities, has acknowledged that only a “distinct vocal
minority” of Ugandan displaced persons shares its views.49 Other reports have painted a more complex picture, emphasizing a diversity of
viewpoints and reasoning among victims while nevertheless confirming
pervasive victim sentiment opposing the ICC warrants.50
What, then, has divided the parties? The issue appears to be largely
one of timing and assurances. The Ugandan authorities publicly pledged
that they would go to the ICC to seek withdrawal of charges, but only
after the LRA leaders surrendered and underwent the mato oput ceremony.51 The LRA, by contrast, repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of
the charges as a pre-condition to a final agreement. Of course, such a
withdrawal was not something the Ugandan government could accomplish without the cooperation of the ICC. As the New York Times noted
in reference to the stalled negotiations in 2006, it was “an impasse that
possibly only the international court [could] break.”52
Since that time, the process has followed a familiar pattern. Months
of negotiations have yielded apparent breakthroughs, only to have hopes
dashed by Kony’s last-minute refusals to emerge and sign agreements.
Each round also has revealed repeated attempts to devise acceptable alternatives to ICC jurisdiction. After returning to the negotiating table,
the Ugandan government and the LRA signed a June 2007 Agreement
on Accountability and Reconciliation (Agreement) dealing specifically
with the question of accountability for serious crimes.53 Although the
48. There is hope for peace in the north – Egeland, AFROL NEWS/IRIN, Nov. 15, 2006,
http://www.afrol.com/articles/22662.
49. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BENCHMARKS FOR ASSESSING POSSIBLE NATIONAL
ALTERNATIVES TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT CASES AGAINST LRA LEADERS (2007),
reprinted in BENCHMARKS FOR JUSTICE FOR SERIOUS CRIMES IN NORTHERN UGANDA 1, 4
(2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/pub/2008/ij/uganda_memos_cover.pdf.
50. One 2007 study of Ugandan victim sentiment found that “[s]entiments of anger and
vengefulness and a desire for prosecution abound in many communities, though there are still
some perceived pragmatic advantages to amnesty, particularly to facilitate the return home of
low-level LRA perpetrators (including former abductees), whom many respondents consider
‘children of the community.’” MAKING PEACE OUR OWN, supra note 23, at ii. The same report
confirms the existence of an “overwhelming desire for reconciliation,” albeit with views differing
on how best to accomplish reconciliation. Id.
51. Allio at al., supra note 36.
52. Gettleman, supra note 5, at A8.
53. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement (Nov. 18, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc589232.pdf
[hereinafter Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation]; see also UGANDA: LRA Talks
Reach Agreement on Accountability, IRIN, June 30, 2007, http://irinnews.org/Report.aspx?
ReportId=73010.
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document’s preamble highlights a specific commitment to “the requirements of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
and in particular the principle of complementarity,” the Agreement raises more questions than it answers about the handling of LRA crimes.54
Emphasizing throughout the dual goals of “accountability” and “reconciliation,” the Agreement endorses a combination of methods to achieve
them. On the one hand, the Agreement specifies that “[t]raditional justice mechanisms [including mato oput as well as others] . . . shall be
promoted, with necessary modifications, as a central part of the framework for accountability and reconciliation.”55 On the other hand, it also
provides that “[f]ormal criminal and civil justice measures shall be applied to any individual who is alleged to have committed serious crimes
or human rights violations in the course of the conflict,”56 and that those
“alleged to bear particular responsibility for the most serious crimes, especially crimes amounting to international crimes” are subject to the jurisdiction of “formal courts provided for under the Constitution.”57
While these provisions would seem to abandon the idea of using mato oput or some other form of traditional justice to try Kony and other
suspects targeted by the ICC, the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation does not equate the use of formal courts with the imposition
of typical criminal penalties. Instead it provides that “[l]egislation shall
introduce a regime of alternative penalties and sanctions which shall apply, and replace existing penalties, with respect to serious crimes and
human rights violations committed by non-state actors in the course of
the conflict.”58 The Agreement offers no detail on what the content of
these alternative penalties shall provide except that they shall, “as relevant, reflect the gravity of the crimes or violations; promote reconciliation between individuals and within communities; promote the rehabilitation of offenders; take into account an individual’s admissions or other
cooperation with proceedings; and, require perpetrators to make reparations to victims.”59 Since the time of the Agreement, Ugandan President
Yoweri Museveni has continued to endorse the idea of traditional justice
or amnesty for Kony, thereby raising further questions as to whether the
Agreement is intended as a departure from these measures.60
54. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, supra note 53, pmbl.
55. Id. cl. 3.1.
56. Id. cl. 4.1. This provision suggests a further distinction between LRA and government
suspects by providing that “state actors shall be subjected to existing criminal justice processes
and not to special justice processes under this Agreement.” Id.
57. Id. cl. 6.1.
58. Id. cl. 6.3.
59. Id. cl. 6.4.
60. See, e.g., Ugandan Rebel Leader Still Eligible for Amnesty: Museveni, AGENCE FR.PRESSE, Mar. 9, 2009, available at 3/9/09 AGFRP 18:10:00 (Westlaw).
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In February 2008, the parties executed a further annex to the June
29th agreement specifying, among other provisions, that trials of individuals accused of serious crimes shall be handled by a newly created
special division of the High Court of Uganda.61 The annex also reaffirms the commitment to traditional justice, including mato oput, and
provides for the establishment of a government body charged with truthseeking and preservation of historical memory, among other tasks.62
Days later, the parties announced a “permanent cease-fire” agreement,
hailed by one media source as “a major step toward a final peace settlement to their two-decade war.”63 In April, however, Kony once again
refused to appear for a scheduled signing ceremony and reverted to his
previous refusal to sign a final peace agreement until the ICC had
quashed the outstanding warrants.64 Another scheduled signing came
and went that November.65 In the meantime, news reports reflected increasing LRA abductions of young children.66
With the prospects of a negotiated peace appearing increasingly remote, Uganda reverted to military efforts in late 2008, launching a joint
operation with DR Congo and Sudan aimed at encircling and defeating
the LRA in the area of the Congo-Uganda border.67 Although the operation benefited from U.S. military assistance, initial reports indicated a
botched operation that backfired after Kony and the bulk of his forces
escaped intact and promptly proceeded to take their revenge on Congolese villagers.68 By early February the rampage had reportedly claimed
the lives of almost one thousand civilians, with others abducted or left
mutilated.69
Notwithstanding these initial setbacks, the renewed military pressure
appeared for a time to be taking its toll on the LRA. First, reports
emerged that two of the three living suspects accused by the ICC—LRA
61. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, cl. 7 (June 29, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc589233.pdf [hereinafter Annexure to the Agreement].
62. Id. cls. 3, 19–21.
63. Uganda and Rebels Sign Cease-Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at A4.
64. Jeffrey Gettelman & Alexis Okeowo, Warlord’s Absence Derails Another Peace Effort in
Uganda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2008, at A9.
65. Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at A1.
66. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Uganda: LRA Atrocities Demand Action (May
19, 2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/05/19/uganda-lra-regional-atrocitiesdemand-action.
67. Gettleman & Schmitt, supra note 65, at A1, A7.
68. Id.
69. Id. at A1; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE CHRISTMAS MASSACRES: LRA
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS IN NORTHERN CONGO (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/drc0209webwcover_1.pdf.
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commanders Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo—had defected
from the rebels and were willing to surrender in exchange for amnesty
and assurances that they would not be sent to the ICC.70 Both men are
charged with directing LRA atrocities, and the Odhiambo warrant singles him out for particular brutality, noting that he “is described by former LRA commanders and members as a ‘ruthless killer’, ‘the one who
killed the most’, and ‘a ‘bitter’ man who will kill anyone.’”71 Next, reports emerged that Kony was surrounded in a swamp in DR Congo with
a reduced force of only 250 fighters and little hope of escape.72 In
March, however, Uganda withdrew its troops from DR Congo, raising
fears that the operation had failed and that Kony might return to Uganda
to commit additional crimes.73
As this Article goes to press, the final contours of peace and justice in
Uganda remain unclear. The possibility of the LRA’s military defeat
might render irrelevant any offers made in earlier negotiations, but proposals to employ alternative justice mechanisms have in fact continued.
At a February 2009 press conference, Museveni reportedly promised
amnesty to Ongwen and Odhiambo and emphasized that Kony would
also have received amnesty had he signed the Juba peace agreements
the previous April.74 Museveni has also recently reemphasized that
“Kony still has a chance to take advantage of the amnesty if he stops
fighting.”75 At the same time, Uganda has yet to clarify the nature of the
court system promised under the 2008 annex. Thus, not only do the major LRA suspects remain at large, but it remains unclear what, if any,
punitive measures will be applied in the event the suspects are apprehended.76 Given the LRA’s past behavior, it is reasonable to suppose
that Kony will not surrender absent a commitment on Uganda’s part to
minimal, even token, punishment.77 Moreover, the ICC arrest warrants
70. Bill Oketch et al., Kampala Faces Odhiambo Dilemma, ICC AFR. UPDATE (Inst. for War
& Peace Reporting), Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.iwpr.net/EN-acr-f-349637.
71. Odhiambo Warrant, supra note 2, ¶ 9.
72. Barbara Among, Kony, 250 Rebels Trapped in Swamp, THE NEW VISION (Kampala), Feb.
15, 2009, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/671597.
73. Samuel Richard Egadu, Congo Withdrawal Sparks Panic, ICC AFR. UPDATE (Inst. for
War & Peace Reporting), Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=351062.
74. Odhiambo Won’t Face World Court, THE NEW VISION (Kampala), Feb. 10, 2009, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/671013.
75. Ugandan Rebel Leader Still Eligible for Amnesty, supra note 60.
76. See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the Admissibility of the
Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute, ¶ 44 (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc641259.pdf.
77. Milton Olupot, LRA, Gov’t Agree on Disarmament, THE NEW VISION (Kampala), Feb. 25,
2008, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/613519 (“Prominent Acholi have welcomed the progress in the peace talks but expressed doubt whether Kony would submit himself to
a special division of the Ugandan High Court, as agreed last week.”).
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remain in effect with no word as to whether, and under what conditions,
the ICC will defer to domestic justice initiatives.

II.

UGANDA AND THE ROME STATUTE

As a legal matter, the LRA’s concerns about the enforceability of a
final peace deal that sidelines the ICC are well-founded. Although it
was Uganda itself that referred the LRA’s abuses to the Court, the
Rome Statute lacks any provision contemplating the withdrawal of referrals submitted by States Parties.78 And because Uganda is a party to
the Rome Statute, the ICC prosecutor did not even require Uganda’s authorization to bring charges against the LRA suspects.79 The matter,
then, is not really in Uganda’s hands at all, as the arrest warrants for
Kony and his underlings cannot be withdrawn unless the ICC itself
agrees to do so.
Moreover, influential voices within the international human rights
community have urged the ICC to reject domestic justice alternatives, at
least to the extent that they do not offer serious punishments for serious
international crimes.80 These voices include former prosecutors of the
ICC’s predecessor international criminal tribunals.81 For instance, Richard Goldstone, former chief prosecutor for the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, objected that the ICC is not “a convenient hot water
tap that can be turned on or off” and has condemned Ugandan President
Museveni for “acting in contravention of international law. . . . His government signed the . . . Rome Statute, and offers of amnesty violate the
letter of the law.”82

78. See Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and
Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 222 (2008); Adel Maged,
Withdrawal of Referrals—A Serious Challenge to the Function of the ICC, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV.
419, 420 (2006).
79. Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 12–13, 15.
80. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Uganda: Agreement and Annex on Accountability and Reconciliation Falls Short of a Comprehensive Plan to End Impunity, AI Index AFR 59/001/2008, at 4–5,
(Mar. 1, 2008), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDoc
UnidFilename/LRON-7CTEZN-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 49, at 5–7; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Uganda: No Amnesty for Atrocities
(July 28, 2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/07/28/uganda-no-amnestyatrocities.
81. See, e.g., Katy Glassborrow, Peace Versus Justice in Uganda, ICC AFR. UPDATE (Inst. for
War & Peace Reporting), Sept. 27, 2006, available at http://iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=324160; Joe
De Capua, VOA News: LRA Leaders Must be Brought to Justice, Says a Former Chief Prosecutor
(Voice of America radio broadcast Apr. 23, 2007), available at http://www.voanews.com/english/
archive/2007-04/2007-04-23-voa12.cfm?moddate=2007-04-23.
82. Glassborrow, supra note 81.
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What, if anything, does the Rome Statute itself say about these matters? Does it provide any guidance as to what impact a final Ugandan
peace deal might have on the outstanding warrants? Contrary to Goldstone’s confident invocation of the “letter of the law,” the ICC’s constitutive treaty is surprisingly silent on this matter, raising difficult questions about how exactly the ICC’s work should relate to national efforts.
Substantial debate has focused on two provisions of the Rome Statute to
which I turn here, both of which are central to the ICC’s eventual response to a Ugandan peace proposal: Article 17, with its framework for
mandatory deference to state investigations and prosecutions, and Article 53, which allows that the prosecutor may otherwise decline to investigate or prosecute based on the “interests of justice.”
I am, of course, not the first to identify the ambiguities raised by
these articles. In highlighting these provisions, however, my aim is not
merely to expose interpretational complexities, but instead to call attention to the ways in which the application of these provisions to situations like that in Uganda complicates the very rationales traditionally
invoked to justify the ICC’s existence.

A.

Article 17: Complementarity

It is often said that the ICC is a court of last resort, designed to intervene only when other avenues of justice have failed.83 The Rome Statute’s preamble emphasizes this design when it proclaims that “the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”84 Article 17 of the
Statute gives effect to this aspiration by providing that cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes otherwise within the
Court’s jurisdiction may be inadmissible if subject to national investigation or prosecution.
The question of how ICC trials intersect with state proceedings is
plainly an important one. From one vantage point, complementarity defines the scope of the Court’s own work. Yet perhaps even more important is the perspective of the state seeking deference from the ICC. Although the Rome Statute itself does not speak in these terms, it is
natural to conceive of complementarity as defining a state’s obligations.
At his swearing-in ceremony, current ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo
emphasized that “[a]s a consequence of complementarity, the number of
cases that reach the Court should not be a measure [of] its efficiency.
On the contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as a conse83. See, e.g., Moreno-Ocampo Address at Nuremberg, supra note 12 (“[T]he Court intervenes
as a last resort, when States are unable or unwilling to act . . . .”).
84. Rome Statute, supra note 7, pmbl.
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quence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a
major success.”85 The reverse implication, of course, is that the prosecution of a matter by the ICC signals that something has gone wrong at the
national level or that efforts by domestic authorities have proven inadequate. In other words, the ICC’s structure ensures that in many cases the
state itself is on trial in some substantial sense. For a state that now, like
Uganda, seeks to avoid the intervention of the ICC, it is critically important to know which responses to past crimes will command the deference of the ICC.

1.

Text

The requirements of Article 17 are superficially straightforward and
provide separately for national proceedings at the investigation, prosecution, and post-judgment phases. First, a case “being investigated or
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it” is inadmissible
“unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”86 Similarly, if a state has investigated a case
and “has decided not to prosecute the person concerned,”87 the result
must stand “unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.”88 Finally, where a “person
concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of [a]
complaint,” the case is inadmissible unless the proceedings in the other
court “[w]ere for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court” or
“[o]therwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international
law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”89
There is also an important procedural dimension to these provisions.
In the event that the Court pursues an investigation or case, both the accused and any state with jurisdiction are entitled to contest jurisdiction
and admissibility before a Pre-Trial Chamber, in which case complementarity becomes a judicially-applied principle.90 The presiding PreTrial Chamber may also raise the question of admissibility on its own

85. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court, Statement at the Ceremony
for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 2 (June
16, 2003), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/MorenoOcampo16June03.pdf.
86. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 17(1)(a).
87. Id. art. 17(1)(b).
88. Id.
89. Id. arts. 17(1)(c), 20(3).
90. Id. arts. 18–19.
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motion, as it has done recently with respect to the Uganda warrants.91
But the Rome Statute does not provide for judicial review of the prosecutor's initial decision to defer to state investigations or prosecutions unless a state party or the Security Council referred the situation to the
Court, and the party who made the referral seeks further review.92 Thus,
in at least some instances complementarity appears to become a matter
of pure prosecutorial discretion. Less clear is the situation, potentially at
issue in Uganda, in which the prosecutor seeks to withdraw existing
charges based on a state’s compliance with Article 17. The statute allows that “[t]he Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision
whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or
information,”93 but elsewhere it provides that arrest warrants, once issued, “shall remain in effect until otherwise ordered by the Court.”94
Moreover, the statute requires judicial permission for the prosecutor to
amend the charges at the pre-trial stage,95 or withdraw the charges after
trial has begun.96 The deference, if any, owed to prosecutorial discretion
in these circumstances is not specified.

2.

Problems

The text of Article 17 has given rise to various interpretive questions
that have commanded substantial scholarly attention, including booklength treatments.97 Rather than attempt a comprehensive account of
every thorny question that might arise, I will focus here on two slippery
slopes that complicate the application of the complementarity standard
to a situation like the one in Uganda. The first has to do with basic defi91. Id. art. 19(1); see infra Part III.B.3.
92. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 53(3)(a).
93. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 53(4).
94. Id. art. 58(4).
95. Id. art. 61(9).
96. Id. art. 61(10). The difference in phrasing between these two provisions is of further interest because it raises the question of what, if any, judicial oversight constrains the prosecutor’s
ability to withdraw rather than amend previously confirmed charges before the trial has begun.
97. See, e.g., COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS ON COMPLEMENTARITY (Jann K. Kleffner & Gerben
Kor eds., 2006); JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS (2008); JO STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: THE PRINCIPLE OF
COMPLEMENTARITY (2008); William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49
HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (2008); Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect
of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 CRIM. L.F. 255 (2006); Claus
Kress, ‘Self-Referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity’: Some Considerations in Law and Policy, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 944 (2004); William A. Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Some
Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 CRIM. L.F. 5 (2008); Carsten Stahn, Complementarity, Amnesties, and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretive Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 695 (2005).
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nitions, such as what constitutes a trial or an investigation. The second
concerns tensions between the collective and individual nature of the
determination. In both cases, the difficulty is essentially the same: application of the complementarity principle inevitably enmeshes the
Court into contested questions about the purposes of international criminal justice for which there is no easy answer and which may, in fact, be
unsolvable.

a.

“Genuine” Investigations and Prosecutions

Much of what makes Uganda such a difficult test case for the application of Article 17 is the range of procedural models potentially available to address LRA atrocities. At one end of the spectrum is the Amnesty Act, which shields perpetrators from punishment so long as they
renounce the LRA.98 At the other end is the ICC itself, which makes
available an actual court to try Kony and his fellow accused and also
provides a procedural model rooted in conventional forms of criminal
justice for domestic courts to emulate. In between these poles, and harder to categorize, is the model of Ugandan traditional justice exemplified
by the mato oput ceremony.99 By one measure, mato oput could be said
to possess the bare trappings of a criminal trial. The envisioned ceremony includes an individualized admission of guilt followed by sanctions.
But the token nature of the sanction, the lack of procedural rigor, and
the emphasis on forgiveness and reconciliation reveal something very
different from the kind of criminal justice typically associated with serious violent crimes, even under Uganda’s own justice system.100 Finally, there is Uganda’s offer to employ “[f]ormal criminal and civil justice
measures” through a special division of the formal court system.101 Here
we have the specter of a proceeding whose external formalities may be
those of a conventional trial but is subject to “a [yet-to-be-determined]
regime of alternative penalties and sanctions,”102 whose goals explicitly
should include “reconciliation between individuals and within communities.”103
98. Amnesty Act, 2000 ch. 294 § 3 (2000) (Uganda), available at http://www.ulii.org/ug/
legis/consol_act/aa2000294120/.
99. See LIU INST. FOR GLOBAL ISSUES ET AL., supra note 39, at 4, 14; Afako, supra note 37
and accompanying text.
100. See Human Rights Watch, Uganda: The June 29 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and the Need for Adequate Penalties for the Most Serious Crimes (July 2007),
http://hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/ij/uganda0707/.
101. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, supra note 53, cl. 4.1.
102. Id. cl. 6.3.
103. Id. cl. 6.4. Additionally, clause 4.1 suggests a further distinction between LRA and government suspects. Id. cl. 4.1 (“[S]tate actors shall be subjected to existing criminal justice
processes and not to special justice processes under this Agreement.”).
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Applying Article 17 to these procedures presents obvious definitional
problems. The statute does not explain what exactly it means for a state
to “prosecute” a case. It also contemplates deference where a “case is
being [or has been] investigated or prosecuted.”104 Therefore, as some
commentators have observed, Article 17 does not necessarily even require a prosecution at all. This phrasing has given rise to speculation
that an institution, such as a truth commission, that investigates atrocities for purposes of truth-telling rather than punishment might count as
an “investigation” for purposes of the Rome Statute.105
Whatever one’s position on this matter, one point beyond dispute is
that the requirement of investigation or prosecution is not a purely formal or mechanical demand. The Statute requires that these be genuinely
carried out,106 and it refuses deference to procedures that “were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with
an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”107 In providing for
this qualification, the drafters were most directly concerned with the
prospect of states using sham proceedings—which might outwardly
look much like genuine ones—to evade justice.108 The situation in
Uganda is obviously more complicated, however, because the argument
for alternative justice mechanisms is rooted not in sympathy for the
LRA or a desire to deny the culpability of Kony and others, but instead
in a desire to promote peace and reconciliation alongside accountability.
Determining whether nonconventional proceedings motivated by these
goals are “genuine” prosecutions or investigations necessarily invites
inquiry into contested questions regarding the purpose of both the criminal law and the ICC itself.
To perceive the difficulty here, it helps to begin with a restrictive interpretation of Article 17. With regard to the definition of what it means
to genuinely prosecute, one might interpret the Statute to require proceedings that, subject to basic requirements of due process and humane
104. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 17(1)(a) (emphasis added).
105. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, The International Criminal Court and the Future of
Legal Accountability, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 195, 198 (2003); Keller, supra note 78, at
237–39, 256–57; Stahn, supra note 97, at 708–09.
106. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 17(1)(a).
107. Id. art. 20(3)(b).
108. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Vol. I (Proceedings of the Prepatory Committee During March–Apr. & Aug. 1996), U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, ¶ 154, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (Sept. 13, 1996); see also Report of
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (Sept. 6, 1995); cf. KLEFFNER, supra note 31,
at 115–16 (arguing that while the inclusion of “genuinely” in the Rome Statute was due more to
concerns about sham or feigned proceedings than to requirements of good faith, a question is
raised as to “whether the term ‘genuinely’ adds anything of substance to the way in which investigations and prosecutions have to be carried out . . .”).
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punishment,109 aim to ensure that the guilty receive sentences commensurate with their culpability irrespective of other extrinsic factors.110 A
genuine investigation, according to this desert-based framework, would
similarly focus on ensuring that the guilty receive their just deserts: a
state might decline to pursue a prosecution if a thorough good faith investigation failed to turn up sufficient evidence to establish guilt, but the
state would not be allowed to abandon an investigation or prosecution
for reasons wholly unrelated to individual culpability, such as when the
accused happens to be a member of the military or a government official. Similar principles would apply at the trial and sentencing stages,
and not only to the prosecutors’ conduct, but also to the judges and the
adequacy of the rules and procedures governing the trial.
Of course, even within these relatively restrictive parameters, there is
still potential for much complexity in the application of Article 17 requirements to a particular prosecution or investigation. In the first place,
there is no definitive answer as to what the deserved punishment is for a
particular offense. The trying court, however, can mitigate this problem
by taking guidance from the general sentencing practices of international criminal tribunals or other courts within the state asserting jurisdiction.111 There will also be questions regarding the degree of deference
owed by the ICC to the domestic justice system’s judgments about what
a desert-based standard requires, from the initial questions of whether to
prosecute and which crimes to charge, to the determination of the appropriate sentence. It may well be that a generous margin of latitude is
required.112 But even accounting for these caveats, it would not be hard
to reject justice schemes that provide mass murderers with formal amnesty or limit their punishment to monetary compensation. Therefore,
even affording Uganda’s justice system a wide margin of latitude, the
ICC would have little difficulty rejecting Uganda’s efforts as inconsistent with a desert-based reading of the Rome Statute.

109. Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute specifies that the ICC’s determination of a state’s
“unwillingness” to prosecute shall take into account “the principles of due process recognized by
international law.” Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 17(2).
110. This, roughly, appears to be the approach endorsed by Human Rights Watch, which has
argued that “[p]enalties that reflect the gravity of the crimes” must serve as a benchmark for assessing the sufficiency of any Ugandan alternative to ICC jurisdiction. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 49, at 9–10.
111. For a general discussion of the problems of desert-based sentencing, see Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145 (2008).
112. See Burke-White, supra note 97, at 75 (drawing from analogous areas of international
human rights jurisprudence to argue that the ICC should afford a “margin of appreciation” to domestic determinations).
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The more difficult question, however, is whether Article 17 should in
fact be read to force states into the strict proportionality box that I have
imagined. Indeed, the model I have just outlined does not even comport
with the standard practices of criminal justice systems that routinely
employ devices such as prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining to
abandon cases or reduce sentences based on systemic considerations unrelated to the desert of the individual accused.113 The considerations are
even more complex in the context of international criminal law, where
prosecutions frequently focus on places like Uganda where mass atrocities have fundamentally disrupted the social order and given rise to
unique dilemmas. As I have observed elsewhere, the standard rationales
invoked to establish the ICC and its predecessor international criminal
tribunals have focused not simply on the goal of giving particular defendants their deserved punishments, but also on the broader aspiration
that international trials will facilitate society-wide transformation by
breaking cycles of violence, delegitimizing criminal regimes, and fostering peaceful societies rooted in the rule of law.114
113. Such practices have traditionally been more accepted in states that follow a common law
model, but a longstanding debate has also existed about similar practices in civil law countries,
and legislative developments in some jurisdictions have blurred the lines. See, e.g., Richard S.
Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French
Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV. 539, 610–26 (1990);
Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law
Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317 (1995); Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three “Inquisitorial”
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977); John H. Langbein & Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: “Myth” and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325 (1993). For a
discussion of plea bargaining in the international context, see Julian A. Cook, III, Plea Bargaining at The Hague, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 473 (2005).
114. Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 601–05; see also, e.g., RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE 28 (2000) (“Why punish? The leading argument for punishment in periods of political
flux is consequentialist and forward-looking: it is contended that, in societies with evil legacies
moving out of repressive rule, successor trials play a significant foundational role in laying the
basis of a new liberal order.”); Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal
Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 7 (2001) (investigating “the impact of
international criminal justice on postconflict peace building”); Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure:
Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2031–32 & n.3 (1998) (“[A] distillation
of the goals most frequently articulated by the diplomats who established these tribunals and the
relevant epistemic community of international lawyers” include goals to “channel victims’ thirst
for revenge toward peaceful dispute settlement; . . . tell the truth of what occurred, thereby preserving an accurate historical account of barbarism that would help prevent its recurrence; and,
perhaps most important, restore the lost civility of torn societies to achieve national reconciliation.”); Richard J. Goldstone & Gary Jonathan Bass, Lessons from the International Criminal
Tribunals, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 51, 53–54 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000)
(“The denial of atrocity is closely linked to the committing of atrocity. . . . After a war, distorted
memories can lay the groundwork for a fresh outbreak of violence.”).
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In theory, these special background justifications for international
criminal tribunals might not say much about the mechanics of prosecution at either the international or domestic level. Historically, one of the
roles of international criminal tribunals has been—in Justice Robert H.
Jackson’s famous words at Nuremberg—to “stay the hand of vengeance” by affording the worst war criminals a fair criminal trial that
embodies the ideals of liberal society.115 But for purposes of applying
Article 17 to situation like Uganda, much of the difficulty rests on the
fact that advocates of alternative justice mechanisms invoke these very
same forward-looking, transformational goals in justifying limits on
states’ obligations to pursue conventional criminal justice.
These aspirations most famously took center stage when South Africa
dismantled its apartheid regime and created a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) to grant individualized amnesties in exchange for
full, public confessions of political crimes.116 In its final report, the TRC
presented various rationales for why its method better realized values
such as justice, peace, and accountability than could have been achieved
by insisting on conventional criminal prosecutions.117 It argued that
South Africa could not have made a peaceful transition to a more just
society without offering amnesties to the outgoing regime; that insistence on individual prosecution would inevitably have run up against
the realities of resource constraints, lost or inaccessible evidence, and
uncooperative witnesses;118 and that the TRC facilitated a qualitatively
distinct form of restorative justice based on reconciliation and forgiveness that is independently desirable and not possible through regular trials.119 Thus, despite some possible sacrifice in justice, the argument is
that the TRC process as a whole facilitated a greater amount of aggregate justice or equivalent moral goods than would otherwise have been
possible.
The same set of considerations applies even in situations where states
do choose some form of prosecution rather than amnesty. Indeed, there
exists not a binary choice between prosecution and non-prosecution, but
rather a continuum of strategies, including selective prosecutions and
alternative justice mechanisms that offer reduced sanctions and may not
115. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 99 (1945).
116. For a detailed account of the TRC’s creation and operation, see ALEX BORAINE, A
COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
(2000).
117. See 1 THE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT (1998), available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/
finalreport/TRC%20VOLUME%201.pdf.
118. Id. at 5–6.
119. Id. at 5, 9.
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look like conventional criminal trials. In Rwanda, for example, the government has pursued the death penalty against many perpetrators of the
1994 genocide, but faced with the sheer enormity of participation in that
crime, also has sent the vast majority of suspects (numbering in the tens
of thousands) to informal village proceedings known as gacaca trials at
which perpetrators are offered greatly reduced sentences in exchange
for their confessions.120 Even some leaders of the genocide are guaranteed as little as three and a half years prison time coupled with community service in exchange for their confessions.121 In most cases, moreover, the prison time has already been served in pre-trial detention.
Although the Rwandan government has justified this approach partly
based on resource constraints, it has also appealed to the value of reconciliation, hardly an irrelevant concept in a state where the genocide’s
primary victims, the Tutsi, remain a minority.122
The dilemma, therefore, is that alternative justice schemes like the
South African TRC and Rwandan gacaca trials fall somewhere on a
continuum of justice. They do not offer full trials or full punishment in
the conventional sense. But neither do they present the case of a state
endorsing or turning its back on past crimes. To the extent that such
schemes might be consistent with the Rome Statute, it is difficult to
draw the line between sufficient and insufficient proceedings for the
purposes of Article 17. Once the broader goals of reconciliation and political transition enter into the equation, any number of compromises to
a fully desert-based scheme might be justified. Does a state comply with
the Rome Statute’s genuine prosecution requirement when it binds itself
under a legislative bargaining scheme to impose sentences that are, for
instance, only ten percent of what is considered deserved according to
some benchmark such as the state’s normal criminal justice practices?
How about punishments that are even more lenient, entailing only
120. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2004,
RWANDA (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41621.htm; U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2003, RWANDA (2004),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27744.htm.
121. Organic Law Setting Up “Gacaca Jurisdictions” and Organizing Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed between October 1990 and December 31, 1994, No. 40/2000 of Jan. 26, 2001, in OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, Mar. 15, 2001, arts. 69–70 (as modified by Organic Law No. 33/2001 of
June 22, 2001, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, July 15, 2001), available at
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnLaw.htm.
122. With respect to the background and current practices of gacaca trials, see generally
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW AND REALITY: PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL REFORM IN RWANDA
(2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda0708webwcover.pdf
and BERT INGELAERE, INST. OF DEV. POLICY & MGMT., “DOES THE TRUTH PASS ACROSS THE
FIRE WITHOUT BURNING?” TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND ITS DISCONTENT IN RWANDA’S
GACACA COURTS (2007), available at http://www.ua.ac.be/objs/00167435.pdf.
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community service, payment of compensation, or perhaps some form of
public shaming? All of these questions are vital to the ICC’s assessment
of Uganda’s domestic justice initiatives, whether they take the form of
traditional village justice or rely on formal courts to mete out reduced or
minimal sanctions for the guilty.

b.

Individual Justice Versus Collective Justice

These observations point to the second slippery slope: the relationship between individual and collective justice under the Rome Statute.
The text of Article 17 focuses on the individual accused. It asks whether
a state has investigated “the case” at hand and whether it has prosecuted
“the person” at issue.123 Yet, one of the strongest justifications for nontraditional justice schemes is that they may actually provide more justice for societies recovering from mass atrocities than an atomistic focus
that may more severely punish a select group of individuals while leaving the broader mass of wrongdoers at large. Had the South African regime insisted on full trials for every perpetrator, it might have failed to
achieve the necessary political transition, or it might have found the effort so frustrating and costly that it could only pursue a few cases.124
Rwanda’s over-burdened justice system had held tens of thousands of
genocide suspects in pre-trial detention for a decade before the gacaca
trials began.125 Had the government insisted on comprehensive criminal
trials as the exclusive mechanism for confronting these crimes, it simply
could not have processed a great number of these cases without stretching the process out for decades longer.126 Because they cast a broader
net, nonconventional responses may collectively better serve the goals
of punishment even where they fail to ensure full accountability for individual offenders. To what extent does the Rome Statute authorize this
more encompassing analysis?
Opinions on these questions have varied. In a 1998 speech in South
Africa, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan adopted a position highly favorable to a TRC-style process, condemning as a “travesty” the argument that “an exemplary process of national reconciliation might be
torpedoed, since the Statute empowers the Court to intervene in cases
where a State is ‘unwilling or unable’ to exercise its national jurisdiction.”127 He continued:
123. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 17.
124. See Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 614–16.
125. See id. at 624.
126. Id.
127. Press Release, The Secretary-General, Secretary General Urges ‘Like-Minded’ States to
Ratify Statute of International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6686 (Sept. 1, 1998).
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The purpose of that clause in the Statute is to ensure that mass
murderers and other arch-criminals cannot shelter behind a State
run by themselves or their cronies, or take advantage of a general
breakdown of law and order. No one should imagine that it
would apply to a case like South Africa’s, where the regime and
the conflict which caused the crimes have come to an end, and
the victims have inherited power.128
A group of experts who convened to advise the ICC Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) on complementarity took a less confident view. Opining that alternatives to prosecution “should not be summarily dismissed,” they simultaneously expressed skepticism that the highestlevel perpetrators should benefit from such processes, and they further
identified a set of criteria for assessing situations on a case-by-case basis.129 The group further advised that “it would be preferable for the
OTP to avoid promulgating too precise a position on the issue, until
some experience is acquired in actual situations,” but simultaneously
cautioned that “a proactive stance will however be necessary if, for example, the OTP is consulted by a state party developing an alternative
justice mechanism.”130

B.

Article 53: Interests of Justice

Complementarity is not the only basis upon which the Rome Statute
might favor deference to unconventional domestic processes. Article 53
further invokes the “interests of justice” as a separate and independent
basis to block the ICC’s investigation or prosecution of a case. It provides that the prosecutor may decline to investigate an otherwise admissible case when, “[t]aking into account the gravity of the crime and
the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”131
Similarly, the prosecutor may determine after investigation that “[a]
prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the
circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her
role in the alleged crime.”132

128. Id.
129. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER: THE
PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE, NO. ICC-01/04-01/07, ¶¶ 72–73 (2003), available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc656350.pdf.
130. Id. ¶ 74.
131. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 53(1)(c).
132. Id. art. 53(2)(c).
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Although the language of Article 53 is even more open-ended than
the complementarity provisions of Article 17, the Rome Statute subjects
its invocation to greater judicial review. In the event that the prosecutor
elects not to proceed with a case solely due to the “interests of justice,”
the decision must be reported to the Pre-Trial Chamber for review.133
By contrast (and again unlike complementarity), there is no judicial
check on this ground when the prosecutor does decide to proceed with a
case. Therefore, complementarity provides the more secure method of
avoiding judicial oversight when the prosecutor decides not to pursue a
case and of securing judicial oversight when the prosecutor does decide
to move forward.
To appreciate the significance of this provision, one must remember
that it only has effect when the prosecutor determines the case is otherwise admissible: there must first be a suspect accused of genocide,
crimes against humanity, or war crimes plus a state that has failed “genuinely to investigate or prosecute” the offense.134 Pursuant to an additional statutory requirement, the crime must also be “of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.”135 Yet even when all these
factors are present, the prosecutor may still decline to move forward on
the ground that the interests of justice so dictate. As the ICC prosecutor
has acknowledged, the “interests of justice” recognized by Article 51
are necessarily “broader than criminal justice in a narrow sense.”136
Although the Rome Statute itself leaves wide open what circumstances might trigger the interests of justice, it was reportedly a debate
over South Africa’s TRC that directly inspired the drafters to include
this language.137 Despite “widespread sympathy” for South Africa’s experience, delegates to the treaty’s drafting conference also raised concerns about other “disgraceful” amnesties like the one that the late Chilean President Augusto Pinochet had accorded himself.138 Unable to
agree on a specific legal test, the delegates settled on language that
opened the door to such processes but provided no guidance as to the
circumstances under which alternatives to prosecution might be accepted. In the words of the conference chair and current ICC president
Philippe Kirsch, the “interests of justice” language reflects a decision to
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. art. 53(1)–(3).
Id. art. 17(1)(a).
Id. art. 17(1)(d).
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, POLICY PAPER ON THE
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 8 (2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9F54D-4321-BF09-73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf [hereinafter INTERESTS
OF JUSTICE].
137. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
185–86 (3d ed. 2007).
138. Id. at 185.
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settle for “creative ambiguity,”139 leaving the elaboration of more concrete standards regarding when to permit alternatives to prosecution to
case-by-case evolution.

III. LEGITIMACY AND PROSECUTORIAL POLICY
The mere fact that the Rome Statute raises interpretive difficulties is
hardly surprising. However, the problems posed by the Uganda peace
process point to a deeper instability in the very structure of the International Criminal Court. The ICC, after all, is an institution structured on a
relationship between national justice and international authority. Yet it
is this very relationship that the Rome Statute leaves fundamentally undefined, ultimately calling into question the very justifications invoked
to create the ICC in the first place. Advocates for the Court decried the
political dependence of ad hoc predecessor tribunals whose limited
mandates reflected the discrete priorities of particular political forces
like the victors of World War II or the states comprising the UN Security Council.140 By creating a permanent tribunal whose prosecutor possesses substantial independent authority to pursue cases free from any
political trigger, the drafters of the Rome Statute sought to depoliticize
international justice and move “a further step down the road from partiality to impartiality.”141 In other words, the ICC was founded partly on
the idea that international criminal justice was a legal matter whose implementation must be trusted to competent legal professionals applying
neutral legal rules, rather than to political actors. This conception of the
ICC has also permeated the public rhetoric of the Court’s current officials. In a recent speech marking the Court’s ten-year anniversary, Moreno-Ocampo emphasized that “as the Prosecutor, my duty is to apply
the law without political considerations. I cannot adjust to political con-

139. Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 507, 521–22 (1999); see also Darryl Robinson, Serving the
Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions, and the International Criminal Court, 14
EUR. J. INT’L L. 481, 483 (2003) (“The drafters of the Rome Statute wisely chose not to delve
into these difficult questions [of national amnesties]. . . . The drafters turned to the faithful and
familiar friend of diplomats, ambiguity, leaving a few small avenues open to the Court and allowing the Court to develop an appropriate approach when faced with concrete situations.”).
140. See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text. For a comparison of these ad hoc predecessor tribunals with the ICC in terms of jurisdiction, see supra notes 8–10 and accompanying
text.
141. Richard J. Goldstone & Gary Jonathan Bass, Lessons from the International Criminal
Tribunals, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 51, 51–52 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000)
(tracing the history from the “victor’s justice” of Nuremberg and Tokyo, to the superior but
mandate-limited ad hoc tribunals, to the ICC).
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siderations.”142 The Court’s President Kirsch has similarly urged that
“[o]nce a process as [sic] been triggered, then the court has to function
as a court, not as a political body . . . .”143
This argument makes sense to the extent that broad international
agreement exists regarding both the obligations of states in response to
international crimes and the appropriate conditions for international intervention. But since those questions remain fundamentally unresolved,
the authority of the ICC’s prosecutors and judges in many ways becomes more like that of an administrative agency given a broad statutory mandate to pursue independent regulation and policymaking. The
ICC thereby becomes, in a sense, a regulatory agency whose responsibilities include the assessment of transitional justice policies undertaken
by states where crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have occurred.
Although reframing the ICC’s authority in this way might clarify
matters, it also raises difficult questions about the Court’s underlying
legitimacy. Standard justifications for administrative delegations have
focused on the special expertise of administrators and the existence of
democratic legitimacy through various forms of oversight by both
elected officials and the public itself. The ICC, by contrast, does not fit
easily within either framework. Are the judges and prosecutors of the
ICC the appropriate actors to make broad-based policy judgments about
what form of transitional justice is best for Uganda? If so, the reasons
are not obvious, and there is no evidence that the drafters of the Rome
Statute conceived of the ICC in this way. An inquiry into democratic legitimacy does not fare much better.144 The 110 states that have ratified
the Rome Statute vote collectively on a one-state-one-vote basis for appointment and removal of the ICC’s prosecutor and judges.145 The
ICC’s officials operate, in other words, on an international level that is
far removed from the democratic politics of any particular state, much
142. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Address at the London School
of Economics: The Tenth Anniversary of the ICC and Challenges for the Future: Implementing
the Law (Oct. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Moreno-Ocampo Address at LSE] (transcript available at
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/pdf/20081007LuisMorenoOcamp
o.pdf).
143. War-Crimes Court Won’t Bend to Political Pressure: Canadian Head, OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Aug. 11, 2008. In the same interview, Kirsch provided further reassurance that he is
“sure the court has acted only judicially and not politically at all.” Id.
144. In this sense, the ICC suffers from the same “democratic deficit” that plagues many international organizations. For a summary of literature confronting this problem, see Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 597–98 (1999).
145. Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 36, 42. For a list of the 110 States Parties, see States
Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 25. A simple majority is required both to select and dismiss the prosecutor, whereas a two-thirds super majority is needed to remove a judge. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 46.
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less the politics of the states most directly affected by the Court’s particular investigations. Once the Court moves from the realm of substantive criminal law to the open-ended policy dilemmas of transitional justice, what legitimacy does the ICC have to tell the people of Uganda
what compromises may or may not be appropriate?
Despite the centrality of these questions to the ICC’s mission, they
received relatively little attention in the political debates over the
Court’s creation. The United States, of course, has famously mounted
great opposition to the Court’s creation, but its public criticisms have
predominantly focused on the possibility that a zealous prosecutor
might use the tribunal for politically motivated prosecutions of U.S. soldiers.146 The dilemmas of transitional justice complicate the Court’s
work regardless of how well-intentioned or “neutral” its officials may
be. Additionally, the problem is one that reaches well beyond great
powers, like the United States, to troubled places, like Uganda, which
have far less influence over world affairs.
The ICC, of course, is not an institution frozen in place by its founding document. Ultimately, it is the Court itself (and, more indirectly, the
international community at large) that must give meaning to the Rome
Statute and supply the ICC with its “law-in-action.” How has the Court
fared thus far in defining its mandate and safeguarding its legitimacy?
The Ugandan peace negotiations provide a lens through which to examine the ICC’s first attempts to come to grips with this question. With
no suspects arrested, it has been Moreno-Ocampo who has taken the
lead role thus far, and, accordingly, I focus in this Part on his efforts to
define the Court’s role with respect to alternative justice in Uganda.
Looking at the public pronouncements of Moreno-Ocampo’s OTP, the
ICC’s response to the Ugandan situation reveals two interrelated phenomena: (1) the limitations of ex ante guidelines, favored by some
commentators as the preferred method of enhancing institutional legitimacy; and (2) a tendency to look to external actors for the legitimacy
that prosecutorial discretion alone may not be able to provide. I consider
each in turn.

146. See, e.g., LEE A. CASEY ET AL., THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: CONCERNS AND POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION (2002), available at
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070325_ICC.pdf; John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y of State for
Arms Control and Int’l Sec., The United States and the International Criminal Court, Remarks to
the American Enterprise Institute 28, 31 (Nov. 3, 2003) (transcript available at
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/v.26-2/Bolton.pdf); Marc Grossman, Under Sec’y of State for
Political Affairs, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.
(May 6, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Grossman_5_6_02.pdf).
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The Limits of Guidelines

Some commentators have viewed internal guidelines as a method by
which the Court’s prosecutor can enhance his own legitimacy by functionally creating the law omitted by the Rome Statute.147 Pre-set guidelines promote certainty and predictability among states subject to ICC
investigations and allow the ICC prosecutor to act according to neutral
criteria rather than improper motives. Whether or not Moreno-Ocampo
elects to defer to alternative justice in Uganda, he can protect both his
perceived legitimacy and that of the Court by ensuring that his decisions
flow from neutral guidelines established ahead of time without regard to
the particular context.148 Although advocates of this approach have generally focused on prosecutorial discretion, a similar framework applies
to the Court’s judges, who may use case-by-case adjudications to translate the open-ended provisions of the Rome Statute into more concrete
rules and standards that, though technically applied only to the adjudicated case, may cabin judicial discretion in future cases. In either event,
this approach foresees that the ICC itself will fill the gaps in its
mandate.

1.

The Theoretical Challenge of Guidelines

Although it is hard to deny the theoretical attraction of guidelines,
there are reasons for skepticism about their ultimate value in negotiating
situations like the one currently facing Uganda. The mere existence of
guidelines provides little comfort if their substantive content does not
serve the goals of the Court or benefit its primary stakeholders, particularly the people of the societies most affected by the ICC’s work. Further, the dilemmas of transitional justice faced by states like Uganda
may simply be too contingent upon case-by-case assessments to lend
themselves to resolution via standards that are definite enough to serve
the legitimizing function desired by their advocates.
147. See AVRIL MCDONALD & ROELOF HAVEMAN, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION–SOME
THOUGHTS ON ‘OBJECTIFYING’ THE EXERCISE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION BY THE
PROSECUTOR
OF
THE
ICC
2
(2003),
available
at
http://wwwold.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/mcdonald_haveman.pdf; Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97
AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 535–40 (2003).
148. See Danner, supra note 147, at 534–48. Héctor Olásolo, The Prosecutor of the ICC Before the Initiation of Investigations: A Quasi-Judicial or a Political Body? 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV.
87, 143–48 (2003) (arguing that legislators of the Rome Statute should explicitly implement policies to limit the current unlimited political discretion of the prosecutor to bring cases before the
ICC). For general discussions of possible frameworks the ICC might develop to determine when
to prosecute and when to defer to national amnesties, see Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute,
Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and a Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
293 (2005), and Robinson, supra note 139.
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An illustrative example of this tension can be observed in the recent
work of two scholars who have proposed standards for the ICC to apply
to alternative justice proposals like those at work in Uganda. In a recent
article focused on the Uganda arrest warrants, Linda Keller argues that
the ICC should apply a two-part test to evaluate the adequacy of proposed alternatives to ICC jurisdiction.149 First, alternative justice proposals should pass a threshold test of necessity and legitimacy, which
Keller believes is met in the Ugandan case because alternative justice is
necessary to a peaceful resolution of the conflict with the LRA and enjoys strong support in northern Uganda among the Acholi people whom
the LRA has primarily victimized.150 Second, alternative justice proposals should advance international criminal justice at least to the same extent that ICC jurisdiction would, as measured by the goals of retribution,
deterrence, expressivism, and restorative justice.151 Mark Drumbl has
similarly proposed a policy of “qualified deference” to domestic procedures subject to six interpretative guidelines that he believes should direct the analysis.152 According to this model, alternative justice procedures must be evaluated for (1) good faith; (2) democratic legitimacy;
(3) the characteristics of the violence the procedures seek to address, as
well as the current political climate; (4) the avoidance of gratuitous or
iterated punishment; (5) the effect of the procedures on the universal
substance (by which Drumbl means that the procedures should condemn
rather than trivialize great evils); and (6) the preclusion of the infliction
of great evils on others.153
My purpose here is not to attempt a detailed substantive evaluation of
either proposal, but I will mention that there is much in both frameworks that I find attractive. Consistent with my own observations,154
Keller and Drumbl both operate from the perspective that, in many situations, there is more in common between the advocates of alternative
justice and those of conventional criminal trials than might at first appear. Their respective approaches also recognize that the prosecution of
mass atrocities often faces limits and compromises no matter what form
justice takes. Nonetheless, legal frameworks for transitional justice,
even appealing ones, do not necessarily reveal the correct institution or
149. Keller, supra note 78, at 261.
150. Id. at 263.
151. Id. at 265.
152. MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 187–91
(2007).
153. Id. at 189–91.
154. Compare supra text accompanying note 114 (advocating criminal proceedings and the
rule of law as the appropriate mechanism to restore peace within society after massive violence)
with supra text accompanying notes 116–19 (advocating alternative justice mechanisms, such as
the South African TRC, as the best means by which to achieve peace, justice, and accountability).
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institutional actor to apply the framework. Put another way, it is hard to
see how the adoption of either Keller’s or Drumbl’s approach by the
ICC’s prosecutor or judges would do much to solve the legitimacy crisis
that the challenges of transitional justice pose to the ICC’s ostensible
mission as a legal institution.
Consider, for example, Keller’s threshold requirement of necessity.
She argues that Uganda passes this test because it cannot defeat the
LRA militarily, and therefore, it cannot negotiate peace while insisting
on full-blown prosecutions.155 That might have seemed true at the time
of her writing, but with the recent encircling of Kony and his remaining
forces in DR Congo,156 the situation on the ground began to look very
different. The tide now appears to have shifted again with Uganda’s
withdrawal from DR Congo, and may well shift again before my own
words appear in print, but the fast-changing nature of these events itself
reveals the difficulty of adopting a test whose application requires litigators to assess a state’s ability or willingness to achieve a future military
victory. At the same time, the defeat of the LRA will in no case be costfree. Uganda’s previous failures to conclude a peace agreement have already claimed a terrible price in human life and suffering, both prior to
and as a result of the recent fighting.157 As this fact reveals, “necessity”
is not an autonomous, free-standing concept. Logically speaking, alternative justice can only be “necessary” to achieve some defined goal.
How many lives must be saved in order for Ugandan traditional justice
to become an acceptable alternative to ICC prosecution? Is this a question the ICC will ever be able to answer adequately?
Similar difficulties confront Keller’s remaining criteria. Few would
oppose an alternative justice mechanism that meets or exceeds the
ICC’s ability to achieve international criminal justice; the difficulty,
however, lies in knowing when exactly this is the case, especially when
multiple theories of criminal justice are thrown into the mix. Some
commentators, like Drumbl and Keller, may emphasize the benefits of
truth-seeking, condemnation, reconciliation, and restorative justice as
justifying alternatives to conventional prosecutions.158 Others, such as
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have argued that foregoing the possibility of more serious punishment for the worst offenders
amounts to impunity and will be highly detrimental to the goals of justice and lasting peace.159 Some of these divisions among commentators
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
5.

Keller, supra note 78, at 262–63.
See supra text accompanying notes 67 & 72.
See supra text accompanying notes 66 & 69.
DRUMBL, supra note 152; Keller, supra note 78.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 49, at 3–4; Amnesty Int’l, supra note 80, at 4–
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may turn on empirical questions that effectively collapse into a wideranging necessity analysis that attempts to balance the costs and benefits
of various scenarios. Drumbl’s framework, for example, would have the
ICC consider a range of complicated factors including “the effects of
retrospective accountability on prospective stability,” whether “the society [is] transitioning toward democracy or drifting toward a new totalitarianism,” and, in the event the society lacks capacity to conduct
regular trials, “whether the international community could help build
capacity to effective levels.”160 Even assuming these specific questions
have answers, the ultimate determination regarding the acceptance of
alternative justice mechanisms or conventional criminal proceedings
may well hinge on the comparison of incommensurables. There is, of
course, no ready way to quantify the amount of “criminal justice”
achieved under any particular scenario, and minds will differ about the
various goals at issue.
In raising these concerns, my aim is not to erect a firm division between the realms of law and politics, or to suggest that prosecuting or
judging does not inevitably involve a policy component. But the fact
remains that it was the allegedly “legal” nature of international justice
that most powerfully justified the creation of an international criminal
court subject to the degree of prosecutorial and judicial independence
enjoyed by the ICC under the Rome Statute.161 To the extent the prosecutor is concerned with demonstrating that his actions conform to a
view that his “duty is to apply the law without political considerations,”162 it is hard to see how adopting either Keller or Drumbl’s openended criteria would actually serve this purpose. Instead, these approaches seem to invite wide-ranging policy analysis that travels far
beyond the borders of conventional legal training and that would invite
precisely the sort of suspicion that Moreno-Ocampo has sought to
avoid.

2.

Guidelines at the ICC

It is with this caution in mind that I now to turn to the guidelines that
the ICC prosecutor has actually endorsed. To date, Moreno-Ocampo’s
OTP has issued several documents exploring the mandate and weighing
in on the critical provisions in the Rome Statute. Most relevant to my
purposes are two documents: a September 2003 policy paper (2003 Policy Paper) on prosecutorial strategy,163 and a 2007 paper dealing specif160.
161.
162.
163.

DRUMBL, supra note 152, at 190.
See supra text accompanying notes 140–42.
See Moreno-Ocampo Address at LSE, supra note 142.
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES
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ically with the Article 53 “Interests of Justice” standard.164 I consider
each in turn.

a.

The 2003 Policy Paper

The 2003 Policy Paper defines “a general strategy for the Office of
the Prosecutor, highlight[ing] the priority tasks to be performed and determin[ing] an institutional framework capable of ensuring the proper
exercise of its functions.”165 It is here that the OTP commits itself to the
principle that “as a general rule, the Office of the Prosecutor should focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those
who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or
organisation allegedly responsible for those crimes.”166
The idea that an international war crimes tribunal primarily should
target top-level officials may seem uncontroversial, perhaps even obvious. Pervading the 2003 Policy Paper is an appreciation of the fundamental imbalance underlying the Court’s work: it is an institution with
highly limited capacity, designed to prosecute crimes that are typically
committed as mass atrocities.167 Although one may debate whether
high-level officials are always those who bear greatest responsibility, a
policy of focusing on such persons seems like a sensible way of negotiating the Court’s limitations. This is also the general course that predecessor tribunals have settled upon, either adopting this position from the
start (as with Nuremberg and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda), or settling upon it after high-level suspects became available
for trial (as with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia).168
But does this policy choice tell us something more about the ICC?
Resource constraints may urge the prosecutor to give priority to the
highest-level suspects, but they do not prevent the prosecutor from taking a position on how states should handle wrongdoers that the ICC itself cannot process. Moreno-Ocampo might, for example, seek arrest
warrants against one or two former LRA members who have already
surrendered and received amnesty under Uganda’s Amnesty Act. AlBEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR (2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf
[hereinafter OTP 2003 POLICY PAPER].
164. INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 136.
165. OTP 2003 POLICY PAPER, supra note 163, at 1.
166. Id. at 7 (emphasis removed).
167. See, e.g., OTP 2003 POLICY PAPER, supra note 163, at 3 (“The Court is an institution
with limited resources. . . . [But] the aspiration must be that the Court [through its statements,
policies and operations] may itself assist in preventing the commission of atrocities.”); see also
Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 610–12.
168. Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 627–28 & n.144.
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though the ICC surely could not process every individual who meets
this description, the targeting of even one such person would send a
powerful message that Uganda’s amnesty process is inconsistent with
its obligations under the ICC.
In so doing, Moreno-Ocampo would be practicing a form of what
William Burke-White has termed “proactive complementarity.”169 In
other words, the ICC prosecutor would be using the complementarity
mechanism to give states guidance as to how they should handle the
domestic prosecution of international crimes, including crimes that the
ICC would lack the resources to prosecute on its own.170 Indeed, the fact
is that some version of proactive complementarity is already embedded
in the structure of the Rome Statute itself, whether or not the prosecutor
consciously adopts it as a policy.
To illustrate this point, consider the following hypothetical scenario.
The Ugandan authorities apprehend the three living LRA suspects who
are the targets of outstanding ICC warrants. Rather than deliver the suspects to the ICC, the Ugandan authorities try them in domestic courts,
resulting in guilty verdicts and life sentences. Acknowledging the proceedings to be genuine, the ICC drops its warrants. At the same time,
Uganda goes ahead with mato oput for all remaining LRA perpetrators,
including ones who have committed crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction of similar gravity to those committed by the convicted three.
Should the ICC prosecutor pursue additional cases? If so, what attitude,
if any, should the ICC take towards the remaining tens of thousands of
perpetrators? At what point, if any, should the ICC respect Uganda’s
discretion to prosecute some suspects and not others? In this example,
neither resource constraints nor a focus on the highest-level suspects
shield the ICC from the dilemmas of transitional justice.
Moreno-Ocampo’s public pronouncements confirm his willingness to
accept domestic prosecutorial efforts that are far from comprehensive.
The 2003 Policy Paper itself is somewhat ambiguous on this point, but
it suggests a hands-off approach where lower-level suspects are concerned. It acknowledges that the strategy of targeting only the highest
leaders will leave an “impunity gap” within which “alternative means
for resolving the situation may be necessary, whether by encouraging
and facilitating national prosecutions by strengthening or rebuilding national justice systems, by providing international assistance to those systems or by some other means.”171 It concludes simply that “[u]rgent and

169. See Burke-White, supra note 97, at 53.
170. Id.
171. OTP 2003 POLICY PAPER, supra note 163, at 7.
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high-level discussion is needed on methods to deal with the problem
generally.”172
In subsequent statements, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo has gone further, explicitly suggesting that alternative justice can complement the
ICC’s efforts. In particular, a September 2007 paper focusing on Article
53’s “interests of justice” standard promotes “the complementary role
that can be played by domestic prosecutions, truth seeking, reparations
programs, institutional reform and traditional justice mechanisms in the
pursuit of a broader justice.”173 The paper also notes “the valuable role
such measures may play in dealing with large numbers of offenders and
in addressing the impunity gap,” and maintains that “[t]he Office will
seek to work with those engaged in the variety of justice mechanisms in
any given situation, ensuring that all efforts are as complementary as
possible in developing a comprehensive approach.”174 Speaking directly
to the Ugandan scenario, Moreno-Ocampo similarly expressed that
“[t]his case in Uganda is to show how traditional mechanisms to reconcile people can work together with investigation and prosecution.”175 He
even went so far as to suggest that Uganda need not prosecute anyone
except those sought by the ICC: “Basically we are doing a case on four
people, all the others could be handled using different mechanisms.”176
As these comments reflect, the focus on high-level offenders is not
simply a matter of the ICC’s limited resources, but instead demonstrates
a substantive judgment about how much the ICC should demand of
states confronting mass atrocities within their borders. MorenoOcampo, it seems, has embraced the view of M. Cherif Bassiouni, Diane Orentlicher, and others that states recovering from mass atrocities
must, at a minimum, pursue “exemplary trial,” isolating the highestlevel perpetrators of the worst crimes for conventional prosecutions
while leaving the remaining perpetrators unprosecuted or perhaps employing alternative justice mechanisms of one sort or another.177 As a
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 136, at 8.
Id.
Felix Osike, Uganda: ICC Prosecutor Louis Ocampo in His Office at the Hague, NEW
VISION (Kampala), July 13, 2007, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200707160105.html.
176. Id.
177. M. Cherif Bassiouni et al., Proposed Guiding Principles for Combating Impunity, in
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 255, 261 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002) (“Prosecution of all the perpetrators of widespread international criminal acts is sometimes impractical if not impossible. Selective prosecution and use of ‘exemplary trials’ is accepted in principle in virtually all legal systems
and is therefore consistent with general principles of law.”); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537,
2598–99 (1991); Robinson, supra note 139, at 493–95 (proposing that in transitional situations
following mass violence, it may be appropriate to target for prosecution only those most responsible).
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means of coming to grips with the ICC’s legitimacy deficit, this approach has obvious attraction. The policy is relatively objective and
constraining, making it attractive to those who stress the importance of
neutral ex ante guidelines. By focusing only on the small group of perpetrators whose prosecution is presumably most desirable at both the
domestic and international levels, the policy also extends broad deference to societies to decide for themselves how best to manage the remaining perpetrators and negotiate the dilemmas of political transition.
At the same time, there is something about this myopic focus on a
handful of perpetrators that seems unprincipled, even arbitrary. Can it
really be that the Rome Statute requires Uganda to put an entire peace
process on hold to force the prosecution of just four—and now possibly
three—perpetrators, while at the same time expressing juridical indifference as to countless other perpetrators who have also committed serious atrocities? This indifference would seem to concede so much to
the proponents of alternative justice that it undermines the insistence on
prosecuting the few. In the end, this approach may be more about shielding the prosecutor from controversial decisions than about providing a
principled framework for transitional justice, and as the Uganda situation shows, the policy does not always succeed in avoiding political
controversy in any event.

b.

The September 2007 “Interests of Justice” Paper

A key problem in Uganda, of course, is that the tentative peace
agreement raises the possibility of alternative justice or reduced sanctions for all LRA suspects, including the handful of prosecutions that
the ICC is pursuing. The issue is not merely that there are so many perpetrators to prosecute through conventional means, but that, on a more
fundamental level, it has not seemed possible—at least until recently—
to begin to address the past and secure justice without first concluding a
peace deal with the very persons targeted by the ICC. In this respect,
Uganda’s situation may be more like South Africa’s than Rwanda’s,
with the highest-level offenders able to stand in the way of the initial
transition that must precede the formal judicial process.178
The OTP’s 2007 paper on the Article 53 “interests of justice” exemption to prosecution shows Moreno-Ocampo struggling with this issue,
which is left unresolved by a focus on exemplary prosecution.179 Here,
the prosecutor acknowledges that the Rome Statute contemplates deferral of prosecution based on justice interests other than those of tradi178. For a comparison between the situations in South Africa and Rwanda, see supra text accompanying notes 116–22.
179. See INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 136, at 1.
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tional criminal justice. At the same time, he emphasizes that there must
be a “presumption in favour of investigation or prosecution” with respect to otherwise admissible cases, that “the criteria for [Article 53’s]
exercise will naturally be guided by the objects and purposes of the Statute—namely the prevention of serious crimes of concern to the international community through ending impunity,” and that “there is a difference between the concepts of the interests of justice and the interests of
peace.”180 Although the paper proceeds to identify specific factors relevant to the analysis—including the gravity of the crime, the interests of
the victim, and the circumstances of the accused—it provides no concrete guidance as to what circumstances, if any, would justify deferral to
a state in Uganda’s position. Indeed, the paper concludes that “[t]he best
guidance on the Office’s approach to these issues can be gathered from
the way it has dealt with real situations. The Office will not speculate on
abstract scenarios.”181
Clearly, the OTP has sound reasons to be suspicious of governmental
avoidance of any meaningful punishment of wrongdoers. If the ICC
were to defer to amnesties or nonpunitive mechanisms whenever a state
so requested, the very mission of the Court as a supranational institution
designed to hold states in check would disappear. And the very nature
of the logic underlying efforts like South Africa’s TRC reveals that the
justifications for deferring prosecution rest on a wide-ranging balance of
interests that is by nature a case-by-case affair. The prosecutor who
commits to clear ex ante criteria therefore risks being overtaken by political developments that make alternative justice less desirable. At
worst, prospective guidelines can provide a road map for states seeking
to avoid accountability. In other words, the best guidance is to avoid
meaningful guidelines, and instead leave the question as open-ended as
it is under the Rome Statute. That solution, however, does nothing to
address the legitimacy crisis that situations like Uganda present to the
Court.

B.

Outsourcing Discretion

With prospective guidelines providing only limited assistance, we return to the original problem. How can the ICC respond adequately to the
situation in Uganda without jeopardizing its legitimacy as a legal institution? To date, Moreno-Ocampo has been steadfast in maintaining the
Uganda arrest warrants, although his statements on the matter reflect the
difficulties of having the Prosecutor’s Office make these determinations
180. Id.
181. Id. at 9.
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on a case-by-case basis. I focus here on an episode in late 2006 in which
the presiding Pre-Trial Chamber, clearly disturbed by reports that the
Ugandan peace process would circumvent the Court, asked the prosecution to provide an update on the situation. The resulting document,
submitted in October 2006, treads carefully, arguing for the maintenance of the warrants without foreclosing the possibility of a future
change in direction.182 The reasoning of the brief, moreover, suggests at
least four different approaches, all of which involve taking guidance to
some extent from external actors. In other words, the intuition may be
that the Court is not self-legitimating, and that its response to transitional justice dilemmas requires the support of external stakeholders.

1. Pragmatic Accountability to NGOs and UN Officials
The October 2006 document shows the OTP turning to public statements of UN officials and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to
support the assertion that lifting the warrants would be imprudent. Thus,
after recognizing the increasingly weakened status of the LRA, the document cites to a statement by Jan Egeland, then-UN Under-SecretaryGeneral for Humanitarian Affairs, and also to a report by the International Crisis Group in order to conclude that “the role of the existence of
the warrants in creating pressure upon the LRA leadership has also publicly been acknowledged.”183 In other words, the proposition is that the
warrants should be maintained because they have applied some of the
pressure that brought the LRA to the peace table. In another section, the
document quotes Human Rights Watch’s view that “amnesty or similar
measures cannot be on the table when it comes to war crimes or crimes
against humanity,” and it quotes Egeland again for his insistence that
there “could be no impunity for mass murder and crimes against humanity.”184
On the surface, the OTP makes a good case for maintaining the indictments. To the extent the warrants have facilitated negotiations, it
would make little sense to remove the pressure from the LRA before a
final deal is reached. Of course, this logic is in tension with the OTP’s
argument that amnesty or similar measures should be off the table. To
the extent the warrants have incentivized the LRA to negotiate, that
must be because the LRA expects the negotiations will lead precisely to
182. See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Submission of Information on the
Status of the Execution of the Warrants of Arrest in the Situation in Uganda (Oct. 6, 2006), available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc272178.PDF [hereinafter Oct. 2006 Submission of
Information].
183. Id. ¶ 25.
184. Id. ¶ 34.
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that sort of alternative to international prosecution. Indeed, that is precisely the argument that the International Crisis Group has advanced,
maintaining that the arrest warrants must be maintained for purposes of
pressuring the LRA to the negotiating table, even though, in their view,
it might be best to forego the warrants eventually as part of a peaceful
settlement.185
But putting aside the coherence of the policy as a substantive matter,
the larger question is whether the opinions of NGOs and other international officials are satisfactory sources of decisionmaking authority. The
OTP has emphasized that “the broader matter of international peace and
security is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor,”186 but to the extent
its response to situations like those in Uganda necessarily hinges on
broader policy judgments, there is an obvious appeal to relying on those
who may have greater expertise in the area. And, expertise aside, it may
also be the case that both the moral authority of the ICC and the efficacy
of its day-to-day operations depend to no small degree on the support of
these other entities. As Allison Danner has observed, the relationship
between the ICC prosecutor and the network of NGOs and individual
states supporting the Court may therefore be one of “pragmatic accountability” notwithstanding the lack of any formal accountability in the
Rome Statute itself.187
The drawback of this approach is equally apparent, however, for reasons that Danner also notes. As she succinctly puts it: “If the Prosecutor
is accountable in part to NGOs, to whom are NGOs accountable?”188
Indeed, the proposition is that, by limiting the states’ authority to decide
questions of transitional justice, the Rome Statute has simply transferred
that authority to an informal network of actors outside the affected society. This is hardly a result that would seem to enhance the credibility
of the Court’s work.

2.

Listening to the Victims

A second strategy at work in the OTP’s October 2006 submission is
assessing the desires of Uganda’s victims. As a result of various provisions in the Rome Statute and the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, victims enjoy the opportunity to participate in proceedings before
the Court.189 Even more to the point, Article 53 of the Statute identifies
185. See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 32, at 15.
186. INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 136, at 9.
187. Danner, supra note 147, at 534. Danner particularly focuses on pragmatic accountability
of the ICC to NGOs and states, but her analysis would seem to apply equally to other stakeholders, such as officials of international organizations with related mandates.
188. Id. at 533.
189. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 19(3), 68; Int’l Criminal Court, Rules of Pro-
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the “interests of victims” as one of the factors that the prosecutor should
take into account when deciding whether a particular investigation or
prosecution is in “the interests of justice.”190 One might expect that this
factor would typically favor prosecution,191 but as the Uganda peace
process reveals, the opposite can also be the case. For example, advocates of alternative justice have relied heavily on the putative interests
and desires of Uganda’s victims.192 The prosecutor might therefore appear to be uniquely qualified to take guidance from Uganda’s victims in
formulating his policies.
The desirability of victim participation is a hotly debated topic
among criminal law scholars,193 and the specific question of victim participation in ICC proceedings has already consumed a substantial
amount of litigation, with many questions still unresolved.194 For purposes of my observations here, I do not attempt to enter the broader philosophical debate over the desirability of victim participation. I instead
cedure and Evidence, Rules 89–93, ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002), available at http://www2.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F1E0AC1C-A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-B3E8B115E886/140164/Rules_of_
procedure_and_Evidence_English.pdf. See generally HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO, THE TRIGGERING
PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 107–19 (2005).
190. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 53.
191. For example, in 2006, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution identifying positive
duties to punish and to assist international prosecutions of gross violations of international human
rights law and humanitarian law. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147
(Mar. 21, 2006) (“In cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law constituting crimes under international law, States have
the duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to prosecution the
person allegedly responsible for the violations and, if found guilty, the duty to punish her or him.
Moreover, in these cases, States should, in accordance with international law, cooperate with one
another and assist international judicial organs competent in the investigation and prosecution of
these violations.”).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 46–50.
193. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 51, 51 (1999) (supporting victim participation in criminal proceedings); Michael
Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 65, 65–89
(1999) (opposing victim participation in criminal proceedings except for the purposes of providing evidence); Leo Zaibert, The Ideal Victim, 28 PACE L. REV. 885, 885 (2008).
194. See, e.g., WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, VICTIM PARTICIPATION AT THE CASE STAGE
OF PROCEEDINGS (2009), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/
WCROReportonVictimParticipationattheCaseStageofProceedingsFebruary2009.pdf;
WAR
CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, VICTIM PARTICIPATION BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (2007), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/documents/12-2007_Victim
_Participation_Before_the_ICC.pdf; Gilbert Bitti & Håkan Friman, Participation of Victims in
the Proceedings, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES
OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 456 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001); Emily Haslam, Victim Participation
at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of Hope Over Experience?, in THE PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 315 (Dominic McGoldrick et al.
eds., 2004).
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accept at face value the proposition that the ICC’s duty to take victims’
interests into account appropriately requires some weight to be given to
victims’ desires. Nonetheless, the OTP’s analysis reveals the problems
inherent in identifying and taking victims’ desires into account.
The problem is roughly two-fold. The first is the difficulty of properly identifying the desires of large groups of victims; the mass nature of
atrocities in Uganda ensures that the victims with an interest in the case
are not isolated individuals, but rather entire populations. Among other
complications, the number of victims is much larger than could possibly
participate individually in the ICC’s formal trial or pre-trial procedures.
Moreover, large groups are sure to reflect a diversity of viewpoints,
both among individuals and among different populations within the
group. In Uganda, the greatest support for amnesty and alternative justice reportedly comes from Kony’s own Acholi people, whereas other
populations of Ugandan victims—and even distinct segments of the
Acholi people—are more likely to demand Kony’s prosecution.195 Additionally, some victims are not even Ugandan, as evidenced by the
LRA’s recent atrocities in DR Congo.196 By contrast, alternative justice
is something of an all-or-nothing proposition. To provide an effective
inducement, the contemplated scheme requires the ICC to lift the warrants completely, and not simply to eliminate charges with respect to
specific victims who have provided their consent.197 Honoring victims’
interests therefore requires a single set of views encompassing the interests of all victims. This, in turn, requires taking account of a broad range
of viewpoints and devising a method of weighing those viewpoints in
pursuit of a single answer. The Rome Statute provides no guidance as to
how this should be done, and there is indeed no easy answer.
The OTP has, in fact, undertaken substantial outreach efforts to
Uganda’s victims, having “conducted more than 25 missions to Uganda
for the purpose of listening to the concerns of victims and representatives of local communities.”198 Judging from the October 2006 submission, however, this research has, predictably, failed to produce a definitive answer. The document notes that there have been “strong calls for
the execution of the warrants to be subjugated to the end of obtaining
195. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 176; PHUONG PHAM ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS CTR.
(BERKELEY) & INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, FORGOTTEN VOICES: A POPULATIONBASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES ABOUT PEACE AND JUSTICE IN NORTHERN UGANDA 26, 28 &
TBL.4 (2005), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/2/127.pdf; Keller, supra note 78,
at 225–26.
196. Gettleman & Schmitt, supra note 65, at A1.
197. The question of deceased victims and who may speak on their behalf raises, of course,
an additional set of problems.
198. INTERESTS OF J USTICE, supra note 136, at 6.
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peace,” but also contests the universality of this sentiment by maintaining that “[r]adio call-in shows in northern Uganda continue to draw a
diversity of opinions from residents and victims there, including a
strong view that impunity should not be a price paid for justice.”199 Others who have surveyed sentiments among victim populations have similarly reported a diversity of viewpoints.200 The concern is that it may be
impossible to gauge the victims’ interests in any definitive way and that,
at worst, appeals to victim sentiment may simply provide a convenient
means to confirm pre-existing suppositions.
The second problem concerns the potential contingency of victims’
desires on varying assumptions regarding official policies. Although
there may be broad support among Uganda’s victims for employing mato oput in lieu of traditional prosecutions, that sentiment may itself be a
product of various assumptions, including the fear that peace will otherwise be impossible to achieve or the belief that the Ugandan government is unwilling to commit the resources necessary to defeat the LRA.
If so, then the interests of the victims may at some level become dependent upon the very policy preferences of the LRA and the Ugandan
government that are under evaluation by the ICC. There are related
questions about the degree to which victim preferences are informed.
Do the supporters of alternative justice mechanisms have a clear understanding of the relevant alternatives, or do many victims, crowded in
refugee camps in remote areas of the country, base their opinions on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the various options, including, perhaps, the nature of the ICC itself?
One example of this phenomenon might explain the results of a 2007
survey conducted in the eight Ugandan counties most affected by the
conflict. Although a majority of respondents favored either ICC trials or
Ugandan trials as the “most appropriate” mechanism to deal with the
LRA, eighty percent of respondents stated that they preferred peace
with amnesty to peace with trials.201 As the researchers noted, one possible explanation for this discrepancy is a lack of faith on the respondents’ part that peace with trials is achievable.202 If so, one might expect
future answers to a similar survey to change in the event that the Ugandan government did in fact succeed in ending the conflict without amnesty.

199. Oct. 2006 Submission of Information, supra note 182, ¶ 33.
200. See, e.g., MAKING PEACE OUR OWN, supra note 23.
201. INT’L C TR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, ET AL., R ESEARCH N OTE ON A TTITUDES
ABOUT P EACE AND J USTICE IN U GANDA 5 (2007), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/
content/7/3/737.pdf.
202. See id. at 5–6.
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Taken together, these problems raise a fundamental question about
the legal status of victim preferences. As Leo Zaibert has posed the
question: Should we be concerned with the opinions of actual flesh-andblood victims, or is it better instead to posit ideal victims making rational choices based upon complete information?203 In either event, the task
of assessing and giving weight to victim preferences in the context of
mass atrocities is not straightforward. The prosecutor’s hesitancy to posit a single, definitive victim preference reflects these complexities.

3.

Judicializing Discretion

In addition to the aforementioned strategies, the OTP’s October 2006
submission also looks to procedural formality as a means of avoiding
definitive commitments on the dilemmas of the Ugandan peace process.
Notwithstanding repeated public statements by Ugandan officials evidencing an intent to seek the eventual withdrawal of the warrants in favor of mato oput, the document emphasizes that as a formal matter,
“[n]o State or any other entity . . . has sought withdrawal of the warrants, nor has any State or any other entity requested any amnesty from
this Court.”204 In a more recent interview, Moreno-Ocampo has elaborated that:
To withdraw the warrants there has to be a legal challenge by
Uganda or the LRA . . . . If someone believes that the traditional
system is enough to ensure justice and accountability, they can
challenge the admissibility of the case. It is the defendant and the
state party who have the responsibility for this and the judges
will make the final decision.205
He further stated: “I cannot be a political actor in the talks. I am only a
judicial actor at the ICC. I have to do my judicial work.”206
The solution, on this account, is a judicial one. With warrants already
issued, the prosecutorial role fades into the background, and it is then up
to the judges to assess whether the case can go forward. If this is indeed
the prosecutor’s position, the implications for prosecutorial authority are
dramatic. The prospective nature of the Rome Statute’s jurisdiction ensures that warrants are most likely to be issued when mass atrocities are
in process and prospects for criminal accountability are still dim. The
most difficult questions of complementarity and interests of justice arise
later when peace is at hand and the dilemmas of transitional justice rise
203. See Zaibert, supra note 193, at 888.
204. Oct. 2006 Submission of Information, supra note 182, ¶ 27.
205. Felix Osike, Kony Must Face Trial—ICC, THE N EW V ISION (Kampala), July 12, 2007,
available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/575670//.
206. Id.
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to the fore. It is precisely at that point that prosecutorial policy has the
potential to play a more meaningful role.
It is true, as I have outlined above, that the Rome Statute contemplates the litigation of questions pertaining to the admissibility of investigations or prosecutions, and judicial approval is required for the withdrawal of existing warrants.207 At the same time, however, the Rome
Statute gives a prominent role to prosecutorial discretion. Article 53 not
only requires the prosecutor to satisfy himself of a case’s admissibility
before commencing an investigation or prosecution. It also allows that
“[t]he Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or information.”208 While the precise interplay between these various provisions is
left unclear, one plausible reading is that the Pre-Trial Chamber should
cancel warrants under Article 58 when so requested by the prosecutor
under Article 53. At a minimum, the Statute plainly encourages the
prosecutor to take positions on admissibility issues even after a case has
gone forward.
In the event, however, that the prosecutor does leave it completely to
the Court’s judges to determine the validity of traditional justice in
Uganda, it is hard to see what exactly the advantage would be. To the
extent that the dilemmas of transitional justice expose gray areas in the
Rome Statute that resist reduction to legal norms, the ICC’s judges have
no greater claim to legitimacy than does Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo. If
anything, the prosecutor’s investigative experience on the ground in
Uganda, including repeated outreach efforts to Uganda’s government
and its victims,209 would seem to put Moreno-Ocampo at a comparative
advantage in terms of his ability to balance the equities at stake.
Recently, the Pre-Trial Chamber overseeing the Uganda cases attempted to force the issue of Ugandan alternative justice by initiating on
its own motion a proceeding to test the admissibility of the arrest warrants.210 The proceeding proved largely inconsequential, however, after
the Government of Uganda submitted a letter conceding the continued
admissibility of the case due to the lack of an executed peace agreement, but remaining noncommittal as to how the accused would be handled in the event that the peace process were to succeed.211 The Pre207. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 18–19, 61; see also supra Part II.A.
208. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 53.
209. See supra text accompanying note 198.
210. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision Initiating Proceedings Under
Article 19, Requesting Observations and Appointing Counsel for the Defence (Oct. 21, 2008),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578326.pdf.
211. See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the Admissibility of
the Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute, ¶ 9 (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://www.icc-
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Trial Chamber accordingly maintained the admissibility of the case
while acknowledging that the issue might well be relitigated later.212

4.

The UN Security Council

Finally, the October 2006 submission by the OTP to the ICC Trial
Chamber hints at a fourth possible approach, namely deference to the
UN Security Council’s views. The Security Council plays only a modest
role in the prosecutor’s submission, no doubt in part because it has refrained from taking a strong position on Ugandan justice. Nevertheless,
the submission recounts that “the UN Security Council twice has issued
resolutions referring to the LRA.”213 Security Council Resolution 1653
urges all States concerned to take action to bring to justice perpetrators
of grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law,”214 while Resolution 1663 “strongly condemn[ed] the activities
of . . . the Lord’s Resistence Army.”215 These resolutions do not take
any specific position on the Ugandan peace process, much less offer advice on the acceptability of mato oput as a means of addressing past
criminality. Yet, the prosecutor’s reliance on the Security Council’s resolutions, however modest in nature, raises the question of the Council’s
role in guiding the ICC’s work.
The idea of appealing to the Security Council’s views is somewhat
ironic given the history of the ICC. Acting pursuant to its UN Charter
mandate to safeguard international peace and security, the Security
Council established the ICC’s most immediate predecessors, the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
When the International Law Commission released a draft statute for the
ICC in 1994, it similarly foresaw that ICC investigations and prosecutions would largely depend on referrals from the Security Council.216
The Rome Statute’s expanded referral system reflects a direct rejection
of that approach and a determination among many of the negotiating
states to weaken the Council’s role by ensuring that prosecutions would
not hinge on that body’s preclearance. The ostensible reason reflects the
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc641259.pdf.
212. Id. ¶ 52.
213. Oct. 2006 Submission of Information, supra note 182, ¶ 16.
214. S.C. Res. 1653, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1653 (Jan. 27, 2006).
215. S.C. Res. 1663, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1663 (Mar. 24, 2006).
216. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Working Group on a Draft Statute for an Int’l Criminal Court,
Report of the Working Group: Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, art. 23, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/L.491/Rev.2 (Part B) (July 14, 1994). The draft also provided for state party referrals, but only in the case of crimes committed on the territory of the referring state or when a suspect is in the physical custody of the referring state. See id. art. 21. The draft allowed one exception to this rule: in cases of genocide, any party to the Genocide Convention could lodge a
complaint, which could form the basis of a genocide investigation. Id. art. 25(1).
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same concern that I have considered throughout this Article: the socalled “like minded” states that drove much of the agenda advanced a
model of the Court driven by legal rather than political considerations
and argued that mandatory Security Council referral “would reduce the
credibility and moral authority of the court; excessively limit its
role; . . . [and] introduce an inappropriate political influence over the
functioning of the institution.”217 This agenda also likely reflected some
resentment over the Security Council’s membership and voting rules,
which grant a veto over Chapter VII decisions to permanent members
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.218
Formally speaking, the Rome Statute reduces the Security Council’s
role in the ICC to two specific functions. First, as it has already done
with respect to the situation in Darfur, the Council may refer a situation
to the Court, whether or not the situation involves citizens or territory of
a state party.219 Second, Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides that
“[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded
with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security
Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect.”220 The Statute
further provides that such a “request may be renewed by the Council
under the same conditions.”221
For my purposes, however, the issue is not so much the Security
Council’s formal authority as the Council’s ability to supply a degree of
legitimacy that the ICC may lack when acting on its own. As the OTP
has itself expressed, “the broader matter of international peace and secu217. Ad Hoc Comm. on ICC Report, supra note 11, ¶ 121; see also SCHABAS, supra note 11,
at 15–20.
218. See U.N. Charter art. 23, at para. 1 (designating China, France, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, and the United States as permanent Security Council members; Russia has
since been recognized as legal successor to the Soviet Union’s membership); Ruth Wedgwood,
Comment, Fiddling in Rome: America and the International Criminal Court, FOREIGN A FF.,
Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 20, 21 (arguing that developing countries’ “new jealousy of the Security
Council’s exclusive authority over international security matters” and “[t]he recent, failed attempt
of middle-rank powers to expand the Council . . . made it impossible for the United States to preserve an American veto over prosecution decisions by using the requirement of Council approval”).
219. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 13; U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg. at 3, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005); S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
220. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 16. Arguably, this last provision is superfluous because
it locates the source of the Security Council’s authority in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a provision from an entirely separate treaty. See U.N. Charter art. 23, at para. 1. To the extent that the
Security Council’s Chapter VII authority over international peace and security gives it authority
to defer ICC investigations and prosecution, perhaps this authority exists independent of the
Rome Statute and unrestricted by the twelve-month limit. Thus far, the Security Council has
twice invoked Article 16.
221. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 16.
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rity is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor; it falls within the mandate
of other institutions.”222 International peace and security are the mandates of the Security Council under the UN Charter.223 For all its flaws,
the Council remains, within the largely anarchic international order, the
international body that has greatest claim to making the kind of complex
political judgments that the Rome Statute seems to require.
One can take either an optimistic or pessimistic view of the Council’s
ability to act in this context. Although the Council remains hobbled by
its need to draw the concurrence of all five of its permanent members,
an optimist will take comfort in the fact that this same institutional feature helps ensure that when the Council does act, its views will reflect a
broad international consensus, helping perhaps to guarantee both the
wisdom and legitimacy of its decision. A pessimist will be less sure of
the Council’s wisdom, seeing in its workings the cynicism of a system
of power politics that has little to do with the justice interests at the
heart of the ICC’s mandate. Even from this perspective, however, the
Council’s intervention has potential to shore up the ICC’s legitimacy.
The question here is less “Why the Security Council?” than “Who
else?” The Uganda peace process finds the ICC in a situation—likely to
be repeated many times in the Court’s future—in which its own authority seems inadequate to resolve the controversy. The impulse, as evidenced so clearly in the October 2006 submission, is to seek legitimacy
from external actors. The comparative advantage of the Security Council is that it possesses definitive authority under both the UN Charter
and the Rome Statute to pronounce upon the problem. While the result
may simply be to displace discretion from one international organization to another, the politicized nature of the decision seems better suited
to an institution like the Security Council whose own legitimacy does
not hinge on the expectation that its decisions will conform to a legalistic, judicial model.
The legitimizing potential of a Security Council resolution is, of
course, a two-way street, with the potential to provide guidance both in
cases where ICC prosecution is deemed desirable and where it is not.
For example, in the event that the Council were to issue a resolution
strongly urging the execution of the outstanding warrants, the result
could simplify the ICC’s task enormously, by effectively removing the
question of alternative justice from the table (at least with regard to the
specific individual accused), and bolstering the OTP’s insistence on international trials. One can see this dynamic at work in the Court’s Sudan
investigations, which produced an arrest warrant for Sudan’s sitting
222. INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 136, at 9.
223. See U.N. Charter ch. VII.
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head of state, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir,224 alongside two previously issued warrants.225 As with Uganda, the Sudan warrants have
proven controversial on account of their potential to disrupt peace efforts, with many African governments voicing particular opposition to
the ICC’s involvement.226 But the Council’s referral of the situation to
the ICC provides a political cover that effectively removes these considerations from the table as far as the ICC itself is concerned. Whatever
the political consequences of ICC action may be, the organ of the United Nations formally entrusted with matters of peace and security has
deemed Darfur worthy of the ICC’s attention. Indeed, one might even
go so far as to agree with George Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin that
Security Council referrals effectively transform the ICC into a different
court.227 In such cases, it will still be incumbent upon the Court’s prosecutor and judges to conduct a complementarity analysis, but it should be
one “with greater weight given to the legal determinations made by the
Council under its law-making authority, and supplanting the regular
procedures of the ICC as a traditional criminal court operating under
rules of admissibility.”228 Although Fletcher and Ohlin apply this argument only to formal Security Council referrals under Article 13(b), the
basic logic pertains to all ICC cases, whatever the initial source of referral, regarding which the Security Council has taken a definitive stand.
Conversely, if the Council were to endorse a comprehensive peace
deal that trades ICC justice for local solutions, the ICC would be saved
the potentially delegitimizing consequences of reaching such a decision
itself. Although many would no doubt disagree with the result, the suspension of the prosecution would not carry the same potential costs for
the ICC’s own future legitimacy if such deference is forced by the Secu224. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.
225. See Prosecutor v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279813.PDF; Prosecutor
v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ali Muhammad Ali Kushayb (Apr.
27, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279858.PDF.
226. See, e.g., Colum Lynch, Court Charges Fail to Sideline Sudan, WASH. POST, Feb. 9,
2009, at A13; Marlise Simons & Neil MacFarquhar, Warrant Issued for Sudanese Leader over
Darfur War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at A6. In February, for example, the General Assembly of the African Union, a regional organization consisting of fifty-three African states
(comprising all African states except Morocco), issued a resolution requesting that the UN Security Council invoke Rome Statute Article 16 to defer the Darfur investigations and prosecutions.
See Decision on the Application by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of Sudan, Dec. 221, ¶ 3, Assembly of the African Union, 12th Sess., Assembly Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.221(XII), (Feb. 1–3, 2009); see also Member
States of the African Union, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/memberstates/map.htm.
227. George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, The ICC – Two Courts in One?, 4 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 428 (2006).
228. Id. at 431–32.
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rity Council than might result from the Court reaching that same decision on its own.
To be clear, even subscribing to this less optimistic perspective does
not require reopening the old debate over whether Security Council authorization should be a precondition to ICC intervention in any specific
matter. The Rome Statute has resolved that debate in favor of prosecutorial authority, and that fact has already fundamentally defined the dynamic of the ICC. The Court, after all, has moved independently (albeit
at the original request of Uganda itself) to prosecute LRA crimes, and
that initiative appears to have played a role in driving the LRA to the
negotiating table and has likely also influenced the parties to take accountability seriously, even if that accountability comes in the form of
an alternative justice proposal.229 Any intervention by the Security
Council at this point will take place in the context of a reality that has
already been defined in large part by the ICC, which has likely at least
created inertia in favor of maintaining the existing warrants.
Of course, there is no guarantee that the Security Council will express a firm opinion of any kind, and the ICC itself cannot force it to.
But these observations about the Security Council may nevertheless
have some consequences for internal ICC policy. For example, the prosecutor might be candid about the difficulties his statutory authority
creates and affirmatively seek the Council’s assistance on matters such
as whether to defer to local Ugandan justice. Among other consequences, this attitude might facilitate more active participation by Security Council members—the United Kingdom and France in particular—
who are also parties to the ICC and will likely wish to avoid the appearance of obstructing the Court’s work. As regards the Court’s judges,
these observations counsel in favor of a jurisprudence flexible enough to
take account of the Council’s views favoring or opposing alternative
justice, even where the Council’s actions take forms other than the oneyear deferral under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. For example, the
fact that the Council has referred the Darfur situation to the Court could
be viewed as a strong indication of the Security Council’s preference for
international trials over domestic solutions. Sudanese proposals to the
contrary would therefore be presumptively suspect.
How have the Uganda arrest warrants fared under this model? In contrast to Sudan, the Council’s actions have been tentative and noncommittal about the ICC’s role in a final peace agreement. In both 2006 and
2007, the Council issued presidential statements regarding Uganda that
emphasized broadly that “those responsible for serious violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law must be brought to jus229. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 183–84.
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tice . . .” and “that the peace process [must] be concluded expeditiously.”230 Although these sentiments extended some support for the ICC’s
current course, they gave little direction to the Ugandan government as
it attempted to navigate the complexities and compromises of peace
with the LRA. During the spring of 2008, reports emerged that the
Council was considering an anticipated request from Uganda to defer
the ICC’s Uganda cases for twelve months while Uganda established its
own accountability mechanisms following the conclusion of a peace
deal with the LRA.231 The following month, however, the UN Ambassador for the United Kingdom, a veto-wielding permanent member of
the Security Council and an ICC state party, publicly opposed any such
deferral and argued that it was the ICC’s responsibility to determine the
adequacy of Uganda’s trial arrangements.232 More recently, in December 2008, the Council issued a fresh presidential statement condemning
recent LRA attacks, but remained more ambiguous than ever on the
question of legal accountability.233 The statement expressly recalls the
ICC warrants, but stops short of calling for their execution or even demanding a particular form of justice, instead merely emphasizing the
“vital importance to promoting justice and the rule of law, including respect for human rights, as an indispensable element for lasting peace,”
and stating that “ending impunity is essential for a society recovering
from conflict to come to terms with past abuses committed against civilians and to prevent their recurrence.”234 At the same time, the statement
also declares the Council’s “welcome for the Final Peace Agreement
(FPA), negotiated between the Government of Uganda and the LRA,
and reached through the Juba Peace Process” and that it “commends the
Government of Uganda for its continued commitment to the FPA and its
investment in the peace process.”235 Of course, as the Council well
230. The President of the Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, at para. 3, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/6 (Mar. 22, 2007); see
also The President of the Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc S/PRST/2006/45 (Nov. 16, 2006).
231. See, e.g., SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, UPDATE REPORT NO. 1: UGANDA/LRA, 1
(2008), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9}/Update%20Report%2011%20April%202008%20Uganda%20LRA.pdf.
232. See Matthew Russell Lee, UK Schizophrenic on Human Rights, But Says No Impunity
for LRA's Kony, INNER CITY PRESS, May 2, 2008, http://www.innercitypress.com/
uk1sc050208.html. The rigidity of this position must be taken with a grain of salt, however, in
light of subsequent reports that UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nikolas
Sarkozy were open to employing Article 16 to facilitate a UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan.
See Chris Stephen, Justice the Price Paid for Peace?, THE SCOTSMAN, Sept. 28, 2008, available
at http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/world?articleid=4525758.
233. The President of the Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc S/PRST/2008/48 (Dec. 22, 2008).
234. Id. at para. 6.
235. Id. at para. 3.
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knows, the peace agreement it praised is one that would circumvent the
ICC warrants. Although the statement suggests substantial flexibility on
the Council’s part, more specific guidance will have to wait until a later
time once the peace process runs its course.
Thus far then, the Uganda prosecutions remain in the default scenario
in which the Security Council is largely silent and fails to provide specific guidance either in favor of or against ICC prosecution. Here, the
prosecutor’s existing endorsement of exemplary prosecution will mitigate tensions with states that are willing at least to prosecute the highest-level offenders. But where, as in Uganda, that policy fails to eliminate disputes over the ICC’s authority, the temptation will likely be to
rely on the pragmatic accountability of NGOs, international officials,
and perhaps the views of states whose cooperation is especially important to the Court. In the end, the most likely impulse will be to continue
insisting on ICC prosecutions, not necessarily because that will yield the
most desirable outcome, but because of the institutional difficulty of the
analysis required to reach a contrary result. Prosecutor MorenoOcampo’s OTP is therefore right to say that the Rome Statute creates a
presumption in favor of prosecution; further, he has appropriately refused to offer the withdrawal of warrants in favor of domestic Ugandan
justice.236 But that presumption derives in no small part from the impossibility of the decisions that the Rome Statute asks the Court’s prosecutor and judges to make. Hanging over the ICC’s actions, in other words,
is a perennial question mark, one that the ICC itself is not institutionally
capable of removing.

CONCLUSION: WHAT KIND OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?
Where does this analysis leave the ICC and the Ugandan peace
process? The Court is caught in a difficult position. It is asked to navigate the open spaces of the Rome Statute and the attendant challenges to
its own legitimacy in contexts that seem to call for as much, if not more,
open-ended political assessment and balancing than for legal expertise.
The ICC, it seems, is supposed to provide a check on the independent
discretion of sovereign states, but the nature of that check and the line
between state discretion and international obligation remains hopelessly
murky.
In the end, the debate over prosecutorial policy in Uganda is fundamentally a debate about the nature of the ICC and about how its mission
should be characterized and its goals realized. Emerging from this discussion are at least four different models for how the Court might be
236. See supra text accompanying note 180; INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 136, at 1.
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characterized. I briefly consider each below, and then offer some concluding thoughts.
First is the concept of the ICC as a constrained and ministerial body,
charged with the neutral application of well-settled and agreed upon
principles of international law deemed too serious to be entrusted to political actors. This vision has dominated much of the public discourse on
the Court’s work. However, for reasons I have explained, it is actually
little more than a foundation myth.237 There are simply too many unanswered questions fundamental to the ICC’s work that are not easily
reduced to legal rules to support such a narrowly defined role.
Second is the model of the ICC as a modern administrative agency
whose constitutive treaty delegates broad policymaking discretion to the
Court to determine the forms of transitional justice best suited to individual societies. The ICC, of course, prosecutes individual cases, and it
does so pursuant to relatively detailed dictates of substantive international criminal law. But the most important decision—whether to trigger
and maintain a prosecution in light of competing state efforts—is more
a policy question than anything else. This account is fairly satisfying as
a descriptive matter, but it also raises difficult questions about the
Court’s legitimacy and it’s role. Few sympathizers of the Court would
openly embrace this model, and the prosecutor’s own decision to focus
narrowly on a handful of high-level suspects reflects deep reluctance to
enter into this territory.
A third, more cynical model—one that I have not focused on explicitly in this paper but which perennially lingers beneath the surface—is
that of an inwardly focused court whose primary concern is not the
well-being of societies recovering from mass atrocities, but instead the
maintenance of a docket that will maximize the Court’s own visibility
and prestige. The Court, after all, is staffed with a group of judges,
prosecutors, investigators, and other professionals, all of whom presumably are attracted by the opportunity to work for a body that actually
tries cases. With no Ugandan suspects in custody and only one trial (relating to DR Congo) underway, there is doubtless some degree of pressure to move forward with the Ugandan prosecutions as a means of justifying the Court’s own existence. One might identify at least some of
this impulse in Richard Goldstone’s comment that “[i]t would be fatally
damaging to the credibility of the international court if [Ugandan President] Museveni was allowed to get away with granting amnesty. I just
don’t accept that Museveni has any right to use the International Criminal Court like this.”238 Although this impulse is understandable, it is at
237. See supra text accompanying notes 137–39.
238. Chris McGreal, African Search for Peace Throws Court into Crisis, THE GUARDIAN,
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worst unprincipled, and at best inordinately focused on institutional
prestige to the exclusion of other values. It is also an impulse publicly
repudiated by Moreno-Ocampo when he proclaimed that “the absence
of trials by the ICC, as a consequence of the effective functioning of national systems, would be a major success.”239
Fourth, and finally, is the model of the ICC as an incomplete and unstable institution, one that has great promise but that must rely on other
actors to imbue it with the efficacy and legitimacy that it does not inherently possess. At a certain level, this point is uncontroversial. The ICC
has no power to apprehend suspects, and its ability to conduct effective
investigations similarly relies on the cooperation of states and other actors. But the dilemmas of transitional justice suggest that the Court may
need to look outside itself even when deciding such deceptively basic
issues as whether to bring or maintain charges against a particular suspect.
As I have detailed above, the Rome Statute’s provision for Security
Council deferrals does, in fact, specifically contemplate a scenario in
which the priorities of a political body may trump the Court’s work.240
The lesson of Uganda is not only that Security Council guidance is
possible, but also that it may be desirable in a great number of cases,
both as a means of affirming particular local solutions and as a means of
giving the ICC positive affirmation when national alternatives are inadequate. This is a somewhat ironic conclusion given the drafters’ determination to weaken the Security Council’s role by ensuring that prosecutions would not hinge on that body’s preclearance. Yet it does not
reduce the ICC to the diminished role that the United States originally
had foreseen for it. As with Uganda, the critical moment may not come
when the Court first begins to investigate and pursue charges. Instead, it
may come later, after which the ICC’s work may already have helped to
stigmatize the wrongdoers, draw international attention to a difficult situation, and catalyze increased political pressure that is conducive to negotiation.
Again, the greatest value is not the pure formality of a Security
Council mandate, but rather the hope that such action will reflect the
commitment of the international community to seek and support a just
and lasting resolution to the Ugandan nightmare. From that perspective,
the international community’s response heretofore has left much to be
desired. Speaking in 2003, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Egeland lamented that “[t]he conflict in northern Uganda is
Jan. 9, 2007, at 14, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/09/uganda.topstories3.
239. OTP 2003 POLICY PAPER, supra note 163, at 4.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 213–18.
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the biggest forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the world
today . . . . We the United Nations have also done too little. The donors
have done too little. The government has done too little, we have all
done too little.”241 While the hope is that the ICC’s participation can
help catalyze international commitment to do more, the corresponding
fear is that the Court will demand too much of Uganda—and other transitional states—when such commitment does not materialize.

241. War in Northern Uganda World's Worst Forgotten Crisis: UN, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE,
Nov. 11, 2003, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/
e1f176894430fdeec1256ddb0056ea4c.

